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ABSTRACT 
Symbolic Structure in Ethics, Language and Revelation 
Orit Shimoni 
The linguistic articulation of ethical knowledge has been problematised in both 
philosophical and theological discourse: Not only are the claims of knowledge-
possession that propositional language asserts illogical, they are manifestly dangerous. 
The totalitarian or authoritarian models that such claims stem from have been partially 
replaced in both fields by a new paradigmatic emphasis on the impossibility of full 
ethical knowledge. The realm of the unknown, or the 'other,' as it is referred to in the 
work of Emmanuel Levinas, signifies that beyond the ontological that is within our grasp, 
there is the realm outside of our subjectivity. In the truly ethical encounter, one is 
awakened to this realm. 
Rather than reject religion as an authoritative institution, the aim of this 
dissertation is to show that within the tenets of divine revelation, in both Jewish and 
Christian understandings, there is the encouragement to embrace the realm of the 
unknown, that is, mystery. Theologically this is achieved through a structural emphasis 
on the symbolic, rather than the propositional. The symbolic mediates between the 
finitude of the subject and the vastness of the infinite. 
Symbolic or metaphoric investigations of revelation have been made in order to 
answer to the problem of truth as authoritarian. This paper aims to uncover, through an 
analysis of ethics of the 'other', why and how such understanding and articulation of 
iii 
revelation are indeed more ethical. With this in mind, a symbolic approach to scripture 
as a source of ethics is recommended. 
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Any mission of love, any quest for the human good, is complex. Where do the 
responsibility, motivation, methods and definitions come from? Is the answer to be 
found in an external objective reality? Is it inherent somehow, in human consciousness? 
To be sure, believing in the good does not inherently produce goodness. The path to hell, 
as the saying goes, is paved with good intentions. History has shown, as the present still 
shows, there is indeed a catastrophic margin of error. 
Can we ever really know if we are doing the good, if we know the good, if we are 
good? It is of prime importance, and far less dangerous, to profess from the start that we 
cannot know for sure, for even if we are attentive, intelligent, reasonable and 
responsible,1 there is always new information that sheds new light for consideration. 
This new information is often the result of great struggle. 
The world of ideas has concerned itself with this question of "can we know the 
good?" most specifically and explicitly in critical theory, with contributions from and 
implications for virtually every field of study. Theological study is of particular interest 
perhaps because it spans across time with remarkable longevity, self-pronounces itself 
'the good' by positing an ultimate, benevolent being that exceeds the grasp of human 
knowledge, and claims it reveals itself in a fantastic array of microcosm and macrocosm, 
in the realms of personal human relationship, social and national structures, and even the 
cosmological. 
1
 Bernard Lonergan names these as the four operatives in knowing. B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971. 
2 
But if at the root of the theological pursuit is the belief in a myth of origin that 
explains and calls us to the good, the critical theorist must also consider the danger: 
A myth of origin inevitably creates a division in humanity between "us" and "them," 
insiders and outsiders, brothers and enemies. The same myth, moreover, tends to create a 
division within the community of origin between "higher" and "lower," chiefs and 
followers, princes and subjects - and . . . men and women... . To make the myth of 
origin the sole guide of a society's political orientation will therefore generate hostility to 
outsiders and lead to war, and within the society itself, produce inequality, injustice, and 
eventually oppression.2 
For this and other reasons, "the concept of revelation as a permanently valid body 
of truths communicated by God in biblical times, preserved and commented on . . . [has 
been] widely questioned in the twentieth century." In a section entitled "Contemporary 
Difficulties Against Revelation," Avery Dulles summarizes some of the objections from 
eight different fields of thought: 
1) Philosophical agnosticism, already widespread in the nineteenth century, continues to 
question the capacity of human reason to go beyond the phenomena of worldly 
experience. God, even if he exists, is held to be utterly incomprehensible, with the 
result that all statements about God and his actions are devoid of cognitive value. 
2) [In] Linguistic Analysis.. . many analytical philosophers question whether language 
about the divine can have a definite cognitive content such as was implied by the 
classical doctrine of revelation. 
3) [In] modern epistemology... the idea that the human mind could passively receive 
information by some kind of transfusion from the divine mind is widely rejected. As a 
product of the knower's own powers, all human knowledge must in some sense be 
"acquired" and must be subject to the conditions of the human subject. This 
realization, where accepted, puts an emphatic question mark against the divine 
authority usually attributed to revelation. 
4) Empirical psychology has destroyed any nai've confidence that visions and auditions, 
purportedly received by seers and prophets, can be credited as coming from on high. 
Ecstatic states can be induced by hypnosis and drugs. Involuntary hallucinations are 
frequently attributable to pathological states of mind . . . 
5) Biblical criticism has exposed the difficulty of attributing particular words and deeds 
to the divine agency.. . Attempted proofs of revelation from biblical miracles and 
prophecies have been abandoned by many scholars, who regard the accounts of such 
divine interventions as historically unreliable. 
6) The history of Christian doctrine demonstrates that many beliefs formerly viewed as 
divinely revealed truths have been reclassified as human and even fallacious opinions. 
. . . The question therefore arises whether doctrines still taught as divinely revealed . . . 
may not in time be set aside . . . If the dividing line between revealed and nonrevealed 
is in flux, the category of revelation itself appears questionable. 
2
 G. Baum, "Paul Tillich's Ethic of Nationalism" in Nationalism, Religion and Ethics, McGill University 
Press, 2001. 
3 
7) Comparative religion requires Christianity to relate itself to other religions which in 
some cases claim contrary revelations and in other cases recognize no such thing as 
divine revelation. Can biblical religion . . . credibly announce itself as the revealed 
religion, thus setting itself on a lonely peak above all others? . . . 
8) Critical sociology has exposed the ideological component characteristic of belief 
systems. In many cases appeal to divine authority can be a hidden way of obtaining 
3 
conformity and of suppressing doubt and dissent... 
It is the suspicion of this author, however, that the critical thinker must not 
altogether negate the claim of God's creation and revelation because of its obvious record 
of an oppressive, if not unwarranted claim on truth. It is quite the contrary. "Theology 
has a critical task to expose deficiencies in past and present formulations, and a creative 
task in seeking better ways of expressing the ancient revelation for a new age."4 This 
task is unfinishable by nature, but worthy. 
The intent of this paper is to show that in certain understandings ofJudeo-
Christian revelation, there is not only the inspiration, but also the model and methodology 
for how to overcome these challenges. It is in the way revelation points to the very 
structure of language, and through language, that this is revealed. This paper will 
integrate the critical concerns summarized above by Dulles, with a philosophical and 
critical theological investigation of the role language plays in the ethical task. It will be 
evident throughout that a strict separation of philosophy from theology is virtually 
impossible.5 
This dissertation in no way claims thorough scholarship of any one of the 
researched philosophers and theologians, but rather attempts to locate and demonstrate a 
structural parallel between them. This structure, I will show, is the same structure of 
symbol (or in linguistic terms, metaphor), understood as the primary mode of ethical 
3
 A. Dulles, Models of Revelation, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1992, pp.7-8. 
4Ibid.p.51. 
5
 See Lonergan, p.24 on the integration of all fields through transcendental method. 
4 
communication. Revelation, I will show, possesses, and in essence reveals, this structure. 
This paper is a request and an invitation to participate in the meaning and wonder of 
ethical communication. 
An important distinction must be made. Revelation in the context of theology can 
mean two things. For the Christian theologian, it means the manifestation of God's word 
through Jesus Christ. For the Jewish theologian, however, the Word means God's 
revelation at Mt. Sinai, and the meaning held in the Torah. 
From the perspective of critical sociology, mentioned by Dulles, this poses a 
paradox for both Judaism and Christianity.6 If, in Judaism, the common fund is a socially 
delimited group of people, then the sense of 'ownership' of revelation, hand in hand with 
the sense of righteousness, does not allow for the non-Jewish 'other'. This has meant 
those of other or no religion, as well as Jews who do not 'follow the rules.' 
Therefore for the Jewish theologian, the paradox is how a propositional 
understanding of the Torah that names a specific people, ie. the children of Israel, can be 
ethical to the others outside of this delimited group. In claiming its authority, it undoes its 
ethical claim.7 For the Christian, the equivalent question must be whether only Jesus is 
salvific. Cook asks, "Can we say that all human life is revelatory, so that, properly 
speaking, there is no such thing as "Christian revelation?" Or must we hold, as is the case 
especially in many fundamentalist forms of Christain faith, that the only true revelation 
of God is to be found in Christianity, so that all human life must be measured against this 
6
 Due to scope, this paper deals with aspects of Judaism and Christianity only. It is undoubted that further 
investigations into other belief systems would be fruitful. 
7
 Schorsch notes the same question in Heschel: "If, in fact, the true nature of the Oral Torah renders 
impossible any attempt to codify, systematize and, thereby exhaust the meaning of the Oral tradtion, how 
are we to write authoritatively about rabbinic theology?" See Schorsch, "The Hermeneutics of Heschel in 
Torah min Hashamayim," Judaism, 2001, pp.301-308, p.301. 
5 
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one absolute unique revelation?" To the religious mind, this is not a philosophical 
inquiry. In an eschatological framework, the question of possession of the good is 
ultimately a question of salvation. 
What is the Word then? If it is Christ, then we must see how Christ teaches 
openness to the other. If it is Torah, we must see how it teaches us the same. We must 
see what each says about language. How the Jewish and Christian Word relate to ethics 
and language may differ but, in my opinion, they offer complementary visions. In the 
spirit of dialogue, I shall look here at both in order to better understand how these two 
interact, and how they contribute to the notion of a language of revealed ethics that does 
not follow an authoritarian model. It is a given that there are other religions with 
differing understandings and narratives of revelation, however, given the scope of this 
paper, I am limited to discussing the Jewish and the Christian. It is also worth pointing 
out that within both of these headings, "Jewish" and "Christian," there is much debate 
over definitions. 
The tension between the Jewish and Christian religions has come from a 
hesitation of acceptance and a reductive understanding of the other. Heschel writes that 
"Jewish thought is not guided by abstract ideas, by a generalized morality. At Sinai we 
have learned that spiritual values are not only aspirations in us but a response to a 
transcendental appeal addressed to us."9 This is relevant on two counts. The 
transcendental appeal necessitates an openness to those who do not 'follow the rules' 
within the spectrum of Jewish pluralism, but also, the distinction often made between the 
8
 M. Cook, "Revelation as Metaphoric Process," Theological Studies, 4:3, pp.388-411, 1986, p.388. Cook 
refers here to Gabriel Moran, The Present Revelation , New York: Seabury, 1972, (see pp.253-255). 
9 A.J. Heschel, God in Search of Man - a Philosophy of Judaism, New York: Harper and Row, 1955, 
p.197. 
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Jewish 'God of Law' as opposed to the Christian "God of Love" is offensive in its 
reductive understanding of Jewish theology. It is far too much of an oversimplification to 
relegate the Jewish understanding of the Word to a purely authoritarian model. 
Furthermore, hermeneutical analysis often neglects Jewish contributions to the 
field. In his book Truth and Method, for instance, Gadamer, skips entirely over a Jewish 
perspective of the Word, which is absolutely necessary to integrate, not only for 
pluralistic purposes, but because it is directly foundational to Christian understanding. 
This is hardly debated over anymore - that Christianity is a hermeneutics of Judaism is 
pointed to again and again, primarily in the use of Old Testament in the New Testament. 
What Gadamer does contribute is a theological understanding of linguistic 
capacity. When Gadamer discusses the Word as Jesus Christ, he does so in order to show 
how this concept of revelation answered to the criticism of language as reductive, by 
showing a model in which, although there is a divine origin, there is nothing lost in the 
incarnation into man. Gadamer writes that in the case of Jesus the uniqueness lies in the 
fact that the manifestation (ie. the incarnation) does not deplete the ultimate meaning. 
For one to understand this account and its meaning, for one to weigh it for its ethical 
evocativeness, indeed for one to ascertain whether and how there may be divinity within 
one-self, one necessarily turns to and grapples with language. The concern over whether 
language has a capacity to convey the ultimate truth of ethics runs throughout this paper. 
I do not disagree with Gadamer that the Christ event reveals an ethical capacity in 
language, but only suggest that this is problematic and the benefit of revelation is already 
present in the Jewish model. I limit my discussion of Jewish understanding of revelation 
to the work of Abraham Joshua Heschel, which entails both what he calls, 'the paradox of 
7 
Mt. Sinai," and prophetic revelation in general. My discussion of the Christian 
understandings of 'the Word' is limited to those which adhere to the symbolic model to 
be discussed herein. 
8 
CHAPTER 1: ETHICAL TRUTH IS NOT ONTOLOGICAL 
THE STRUGGLE FOR ETHICAL TRUTH - NEITHER AUTHORITY NOR SUBJECTIVITY 
The "democratic ethos" of western, post-industrial modernity, has had at its root 
"the Enlightenment principle." It states that, "the intellectual foundation of political 
modernization... affirms that, "human reason empowers people to free themselves from 
the distorting and self-limiting myths of the past."10 In other words, human reason can 
uncover the cultural egoism existent in institutions that have handed down knowledge as 
a matter of authority, irreverent of the transcendental nature of true value. Certainly, the 
Catholic Church has been accused of this irreverence. 
Critical theory, "in the pursuit of emancipation," n has aligned claimed 
possession of the virtue of truth by motivating resistance to power, which, according to 
its claims, by necessity limits or veils truth in order to govern itself. This resistance to 
power takes the form of new versus old: "This 'radical rupture' with traditional ideas . . . 
[viewed] as historically complicit with the exercise of power . . . has been the hallmark of 
10 
the critical theory project since the Communist Manifesto." Michel Foucault has 
referred to this veiling of truth by power as the 'repressive hypothesis'. 
Thus, tradition, institution, and authority must be reawakened or rebelled against 
in the name of newness. Taken to an extreme, history itself, then, is seen as enemy. In 
10
 G. Baum and J. Vaillancourt, "The Church and Modernization," in Religion and the Social Order, " Vol. 
2, JAI Press, 1991. p.21. 
T. Wandel, "The Power of Discourse: Michel Foucault and Critical Theory, Cultural Values, 5:3, 2001, 
pp.368-382,p.371. 
h
 Ibid, p.368. 
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modern philosophy, the rejection of knowledge as handed down was replaced with an 
emphasis on the subject's ability to grasp her own knowledge.14 Because the subject is 
always new in relation to history, her agency as knower becomes the opposing factor to 
the passive acceptance of authority. 
But when it came to ethics, there is a problem, for even within subjective 
autonomy, a value-system based on knowledge that is grasped is necessarily ontological, 
meaning, it relegates anything and everything that a subject comes into contact with into 
the realm of the 'known'. An individual subject, like an institution, is limited in scope 
by its own temporality and sociality. Ultimate knowledge of the good cannot possibly be 
limited by time and space. Thus both subjective and authoritative knowledge of value are 
a contradiction in terms. Value is not a known. 
TRUTH, KNOWLEDGE AND THE GOOD - BERNARD LONERGAN'S TRANSCENDENTAL 
METHOD 
"What is good," writes Bernard Lonergan, "is always concrete. But definitions 
are abstract. Hence, if one attempts to define the good, one runs the risk of misleading 
one's readers."15 The issue which is at the heart of this dissertation is how to approach 
the truth of what is good, why the risk of misleading is an ethical issue, and how one 
might resolve this issue through a theological understanding of revealed ethics. 
Foundational to this discussion is the understanding that the good, truth and 
knowledge are not fixed. Goodness, in fact, is more like the reluctance to accept 
fixedness. "The drive to truth compels rationality to assent when evidence is sufficient 
14
 The subject is defined by Bernard Lonergan as "the operator" of knowledge, and is also the subject in 
"the psychological sense that he operates consciously." Lonergan, p.7. 
15
 Lonergan, p.27. 
10 
but refuses assent and demands doubt whenever evidence is insufficient."16 Necessary is 
an internalization of this fact, an acceptance of our finitude, and vigilant questioning. 
"[B]y deliberation, evaluation, action, we can know and do, not just what pleases us, but 
what truly is good, worth while. Then we can be principles of benevolence and 
beneficence."17 
Lonergan suggests what he calls a transcendental methodology. By 
transcendental he means that with any results of knowledge-seeking, there is emphasis on 
1 S 
openness to new questions. Transcendental method, according to Lonergan, "fulfils a 
heuristic function."19 In other words, there is something in this openness that lends itself 
to furthering both the understanding of the human good and its manifestation. 
At the crux of his methodology is the emphasis on questions, rather than answers. 
This mode of questioning, he calls intending: 
[T]ranscendentals are contained in questions prior to the answers. They are the radical 
intending that moves us from ignorance to knowledge... They are unrestricted because 
answers are never complete and so only give rise to still further questions. They are 
comprehensive because they intend the unknown whole of totality of which our answers 
reveal only part.20 
In the context of ethics, the question of knowing values is of fundamental 
importance. Claiming to know a value with certainty is problematic in that it does not 
respect the transcendental objective, which highlights the incompleteness of our 
knowledge. Lonergan suggests that value itself must be understood as a transcendental 
notion. "It is what is intended in questions for deliberation... Such intending is not 
knowing . . So when I ask whether this is truly and not merely apparently good, whether 
16




 Ibid. pp. 13-14. 
19
 Ibid. p.22. 
20
 Ibid. p. 11. 
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that is or is not worth while, I do not yet know value but am intending value."21 So too is 
the human relation to divine ethical knowledge. 
Lonergan implies that the quest for knowledge of the good (of value) always falls 
short of any ultimate and unchallenged claim, yet it forever seeks it. "[T]he 
transcendental notion of the good so invites, presses, harries us, that we could rest only in 
an encounter with a goodness completely beyond its powers of criticism." 
In both subjective and authoritative structures of knowledge, ethics does not 
actually relate to these 'others', because it does not admit the unknowability that these 
others pose. If ethics is by its nature relational, meaning that outside of the knowing 
subject and the known object there is always an "other", pure ontology does not indicate 
this. 
With similar reasoning, in Hermeneutics Religion And Ethics , Hans-Georg 
Gadamer gives a predominantly historical survey of the philosophical developments 
regarding ethics. In Chapter 4: "The Ontological Problem of Value," he writes: "What is 
at issue is not just the question of how normative propositions and value judgments can 
have a logical legitimacy on a par with that of theoretical propositions, but whether a 
normative claim like that ascribed to "value" is legitimate - that is, whether it possesses a 
binding, obligatory "being" independent of the valuer." In other words, the question 
that arises is whether value can be discussed in terms of being at all, the value never 
independent of the valuer and the valued. 
21
 Ibid. p.34. 
22
 Ibid. p.36. 
23
 Gadamer, Hermeneutics, Religion and Ethics (trans. Joel Weinsheimer), New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1999, pp.58-59. This chapter is dated 1971. 
12 
The assertion of particular values as 'true', even when done in reaction to older 
authorities, has often proven equally oppressive and limiting. Wandel highlights how 
Foucault admits that in the search for truth, as new structures of knowledge are asserted, 
the search for ethics is often lost. This last statement is of significance, for it shows that a 
strict dichotomy between institution and critical theorist is false. The concern for the 
human good pervades both, and in both, the danger of eluding it also lurks. 
The problem with ethics, therefore, is not old knowledge versus new knowledge, 
but knowledge itself. Neither truth as traditional authority, nor truth reached through 
'enlightened' subjectivity, are sufficient. A new strategy that is aware of its own 
limitation and relationality is necessary. Truth must be the serpent eating its tale. It must 
constantly 'sting itself awake,'24 for progress of knowledge requires that the process of 
coming to know repeat itself endlessly. Lonergan explains this in his discussion of 
progress: 
Progress proceeds from originating value, from subjects.. . observing the transcendental 
precepts, Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible. Being attentive includes 
attention to human affairs. Being intelligent includes a grasp of hitherto unnoticed or unrealized 
possibilities. Being reasonable includes the rejection of what probably would not work but also 
the acknowledgment of what probably would. Being responsible includes basing one's decisions 
and choices on an unbiased evaluation of short-term and long-term costs and benefits to oneself, to 
one's group, to other groups, [my emphasis] 
Progress, of course, is not some single improvement but a continuous flow of them. But 
the transcendental precepts are permanent. Attention, intelligence, reasonableness and 
responsibility are to be exercised not only with respect to the existing situation, but also with 
respect to the subsequent, changed situation . . . So change begets further change and the sustained 
observance of the transcendental precepts makes these cumulative changes an instance of 
progress.25 
Truth must become, rather than the static possession of knowledge, the state of 
being-in-question. "Rather than countering homogenizing and normalizing truth claims 
with new truth claims, the strategy is now not only a refusal to defer to . . . truer truths, 
From the Dylan Thomas poem 'Incarnate Devil' in Collected Poems 1934-1952, London: J.Bent & Sons 
Limited, 1952. 
25
 Lonergan, p.53. 
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but a resolve to bombard the power of the Same with the difference of the Other." 
Implied in this distinction is truth that is considered acquired becomes absorbed within 
one's ontological horizon. The difference of the other is what forces us to acknowledge 
what lies beyond it. Truth is the dynamic structure that shows the relationships between 
these horizons. In his suggestion that the transcendental precepts are permanent, 
Lonergan implies that there is stability in the manner in which truth is sought. The 
stability lies in the relational dynamic of self to 'other,' a dynamic I will show is present 
in Judeo-Christian revelation. It is ethics based on the notion of the other that brings us 
to Emmanuel Levinas. 
LEVINAS - ETHICS OF THE OTHER 
"Since its infancy, philosophy has been filled with a horror of the other that 
remains other, with an insurmountable allergy. This revulsion toward the other 
ultimately leads to a totalitarianism of the same."27 There is a crucial element in what 
Levinas says that pertains deeply to this dissertation. According to Emmanuel Levinas, 
because of the inherent relationality of a subject to someone who is outside of herself, 
ethics cannot, by its very nature, belong to a category of intentional, subjective 
knowledge. The ethical relationship is "irreducible to consciousness and 
thematization."28 Levinas claims that which is within our moral horizon is not ethics 
itself. Rather, ethics is the perpetual questioning of our moral horizons, a questioning 
26
 Wandel, p.380. 
27
 Emmanuel Levinas, "The Trace of the Other," trans. Alphonso Lingis, in Deconstruction in Context, ed. 
Mark C. Taylor (Chicago: University of Chicago press, 1986), p.346. quoted by Jung H. Lee, pp.250-251. 
in "Neither Totality or Infinity: Suffering the Other," The Journal of Religion 1999, pp.250-251. 
28
 Levinas, "Substitution," Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis, Boston and 
London: Martinus Nijhof Publishers, 1981.p.89. 
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that is initiated by our encounter with the Other. It is "allowing the Other to disrupt the 
'at homeness' of our own horizon [that] is ethics." 
For Levinas, the ethical relation, namely, the human encounter, must replace 
ontology as "the enactment that makes possible philosophical and theological 
discourse."31 The root or basis for this discourse must be the human encounter, which is 
always new and always begins outside of our selves.32 Thus, ethics cannot be only 
subjectively intended, nor handed down authoritatively, for neither can account for this 
'newness.' 
The argument comes in reaction both to phenomenological philosophy and to the 
harsh events of Levinas's time. Marie Baird claims that the primary objection raised by 
Emmanuel Levinas regarding Heidegger's onto-theo-logy is that it "perpetuatefs] 
consciousness [and the] thematic exposition of being, knowing. Such thinking, Levinas 
argues, "relegate[s] ethics to a secondary, and thus, derivative position."33 This is not 
only logically problematic, but dangerous in its manifestation. This is similar to 
Foucault's argument. The problem is that "such relegation has the effect of perpetuating 
the subservience of the individual to the potential for violence intrinsic to any 
ontologically based conceptual system that would totalize being at the expense of 
individual inviolability."34 
In other texts, Levinas also refers to this 'at homeness' as 'the same.' 
30
 G. Drazenovich, "toward a Levinasian understanding of Christian ethics — Emmanuel Levinas and the 
Phenomenology of the Other," Cross Currents 54:4 (2005), pp.36-45, p.38. 
31
 M. Baird, "Revisioning Christian theology in light of Emmanuel Levinas's ethics of responsibility," 
Journal of Ecumenical Studies, 36:3/4 (1999), p.4. cf. Lonergan, who says the good is always concrete. 
Method in Theology, p.49. 
32
 The word 'new' seems to imply that it is not a traditional source that has already been rendered in 
description. This is important in the theological context, and will be looked at further. 
33
 E. Levinas, "substitution." 
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Emmanuel Levinas's criticism of Heideggerian onto-theo-logy can thus be said to 
be double-pronged. On one level, it is a theoretical argument laid out in philosophical 
claims. But in an inextricably linked practical level, it is both observation and warning of 
the danger of onto-theo-logy in very concrete terms. It cries out against what damage 
ontological thinking can do. Drazenovich agrees that "the dogmatism and 
fundamentalism that has developed periodically . . . is a reactive movement against being 
open to the presence of the Other and has resulted in violence, wars and a mistrust of 
plurality."35 
Subjective and authoritative models of ethical knowledge are inadequate in their 
capacity to reveal Truth as it unfolds. Consequently, knowledge of value, of the good, is 
deemed incomplete. Subjective and authoritative knowledge cannot account for new 
knowledge to be revealed by the infinite other human one may or not encounter. There 
cannot therefore be a possession of whole knowledge of anything. It is always in relation 
to what is not yet known. 
The Judeo-Christian tradition regarding human knowledge bears a parallel 
problematic. Human articulation of knowledge is incomplete, ever relational to the 
infinite knowledge of the divine. Ultimate knowledge of ultimate goodness belongs to the 
divine alone, and will only be revealed, it is said, in the eschaton. 
In both of these analyses, the future is the space of the not-yet-known, and 
therefore in both philosophical and theological evaluation, the sociality and temporality 
of human beings has been perceived as a limitation of total ethical knowledge - a 
boundary. For this reason, in both philosophy and theology, language as the vehicle 
for ethical meaning has been problematized. Heschel writes, "the spirit of God is set in 
35
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the language of man, and who is to judge what is content and what is frame?"36 From a 
critical perspective, the situatedness of language within a socially and temporally 
dependent boundary negates its ability to reveal the infinite sum of ethical knowledge. 
THE QUESTION OF LANGUAGE 
The relationship in question is that of language to truth. This is a key aspect of 
Greek philosophy.37 Put simply "Language often seems ill suited to express what we 
feel. In the face of . . . overwhelming presence . . . the task of expressing in words . . . 
seems like an infinite and hopeless undertaking." [my emphasis]3 There is an excess in 
experience, it seems, that is irreducible to language. This is equivalent in structure to the 
ethical relationship named by Levinas, as it is equivalent in structure to the relationship 
of human to divine knowledge. The role of subjective knowledge in each is insufficient. 
There is always an excess. 
Such a sense of linguistic limitation is due to a partial view of language, which 
sees it as a system of signs where words refer to objects and as such signify only what is 
already perceived. "The sign is always inferior to that which it signifies,"39 and therefore 
as a medium, language is inadequate. But an understanding of language as a system of 
signs sees only its reductive tendencies, and not its transcendent qualities.40 Words in 
this model are reductive because they do not account for the yet to be known. They are 
reductive of any truth that is 'new,' 'other,' and therefore cannot convey the transcendent 
in the truly ethical relationship. 
36
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37
 For an extensive survey, see Gadamer, Truth and Method, London: Sheed and Ward, 1975 
38
 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p.402. 
39
 D. Jeffrey, People of the Book, Cambridge: Wm.B. Eedermans, 1996, p.xvi. 
40
 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p.413. 
17 
The question is how language takes into account the other-ness that makes ethics 
ethics - relational beyond its 'known.' Long before this question was raised in the 
struggles of postmodernism, it was already a concern of theology. For what is the notion 
of the divine word, and how can we possibly claim to know it, let alone speak it? 
THE WORD 
The Word somehow denotes the event of transfer from divine to human ethical 
knowledge. It is not unconnected that revelation is often referred to as the Word. A 
distinction is made in theology, between the Divine word and the human word, that is, 
human language. The inadequacy of human language is emphasized again and again in 
relation to the Divine word, often with a tone of lamentation, much in the way 
propositional language is deemed inadequate in conveying ethical truth: "Only one 
'Word' transcends the mere conventionality and asymptotic liability of all other words, 
and that word is manifestly not of human utterance."41 The Divine Word is understood as 
something that is preverbal, unified, whole in its meaning. Human language corrupts it. 
"For the Hebrew poet," writes David Lyle Jeffrey in People of the Book, 
no single human word can begin to capture what is suggested by these many attempts to 
speak about the revealed Word; all human language, even that by which Torah is 
translated, is asymptotic, earnestly reaching toward its goal of perfect signification, but 
repeatedly falling short of its object.... [LJanguage, even when communicating the 
divine Word, is simultaneously both revelatory and distorting.42 
Gadamer notes the same difficulty: 
Whereas God completely expresses his nature and substance in the Word in pure 
immediacy, every thought that we think (and therefore every word in which the thought 
expresses itself) is a mere accident of the mind. The word of human thought is directed 
toward the thing, but it cannot contain it as whole within itself. Thus thought constantly 
41
 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, 1.13, trans. D.W. Robertson, Jr.. New York: Bobbs Merrill, 1963. See 
also Dulles, pp.48-52. 
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proceeds to new conceptions and is fundamentally incapable of being wholly realized in 
any.43 
Gadamer's concern is parallel in structure to Levinas's concern with ethics as 
ontology. The subject cannot contain the other as a whole. Human language cannot 
contain the divine Word. 
How we relate to words has been a deeply theological question. A concern runs 
throughout Jewish and Christian deliberation with both the imperfection of human 
language to convey divine ethical meaning, and the warning of staying bound to the 
words themselves, instead of the ethical spirit that is meant to be carried through them. 
For Saint Augustine, for instance, "since meaning resides not in the word abstracted, but 
in those entities and actions which words can serve, retreat to questions of language for 
their own sake is a form of intellectual debilitation . . . Only one 'Word' transcends the 
mere conventionality and asymptotic liability of all other words, and that word is 
manifestly not of human utterance."44 Any attempt to assert through language a claim of 
certainty, is deemed both foolhardy and dangerous. 
THE DANGERS OF ONTOLOGICAL THEOLOGY 
The problem with religious discourse that is ontologically based is twofold: like 
Levinas's criticism of ontology, applying critical theory to religious discourse involves a 
concern with the 'faulty logic' of a religious truth-claim from a philosophical perspective, 
but also with the oppressive results of such logic, from a socio-historical vantage-point. 
Where text comes in, for instance, the danger is in allowing what is revealed therein to be 
understood as static, and this is what happens when it is read as propositional only. One 
43
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need only observe the degree to which fundamentally literalist readings of scripture are 
dangerous to the very notion of ethics of the other, and its oppressive potential has been 
manifest in culture, gender, ethnicity, belief. 
That fundamentalist declarations of religious truth are dangerous is a point that 
has already been made, but the concern here is the philosophical reason for this. 
Religious truth-claims, as all truth claims, do not emphasise the primacy of ethics-which-
is-not-being. Furthermore, they purport knowledge-possession of what is by definition 
beyond human knowledge. If it were within human grasp, it would not be divine. 
Success with the "criterion of empirical verifiability . . . could only mean defeat for its 
transcendent claim."45 
If ethical truth lies, as theologians will have it, in God's self-revelation, there is 
indeed a problem, for, logically, it then lies forever beyond our ability to articulate. 
Religious language has either been criticized and disregarded for its incompatibility with 
reality, or deemed unnecessary as a pursuit. Theologians contend with this issue and 
have taken several different approaches. "Religion," say some, "belongs to the realm of 
the unutterable."46 Louis Dupre writes that "Logical positivists have . . . concluded that 
religious language is meaningless and misleading in its reality claims," while 
Wittgenstein writes: "There are things that cannot be put into words: they make 
themselves manifest: they are what is mystical."47 Thus, "the ultimate problem is . . . 
whether a . . .[religious] language is able to deal with reality and, most importantly, with 
L. Dupre, Symbols of the Sacred, Michigan, Wm. B. Eedermans, 2000, p.47. 
46
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reality as it transcends the empirical world."48 Can language convey the transcendent 
aspect of ethics? Can language convey what is beyond ontology? 
According to Heschel, in revelation, "God does not reveal Himself he only 
reveals His way. Judaism does not speak of self-revelation, but of the revelation of His 
teaching for man."49 Unlike the divine Word, which is one, human language requires 
multiplicity. "The human word is not one, like the divine word, but must necessarily be 
many words."50 That is to say, "humans do not authorize any "absolute word."51 
The emphasis on multiplicity of human words is similar to the idea of the 
existence of other human beings in Levinas's analysis. Other human beings in their very 
existence indicate the inadequacy of our knowledge in relation to total knowledge. So 
too this highlights an inadequacy in the language which reflects their knowledge. This is 
significant, for it highlights the way in which the theological question of our limitation 
manifests itself in the human ethical realm. The awareness of other people is like a 
prerequisite in striving for divine ethical knowledge. When reverence to the otherness of 
neighbor and divine is lacking, it is a sign of overly onto logical theology. 
Levinas is skeptical of theology for precisely its frequent irreverence. Purcell 
explains: 
Levinas... mistrusts theology, and does so on three counts. Firstly, theology, as Levinas 
understands it, not only tends to value theoria over praxis, but also imposes theoretical 
frameworks to circumscribe and delimit practice. Secondly, theology attempts to circumscribe 
God, and thus offends and does violence to God's absolute transcendence. Thirdly, in its attention 
J. Macquarrie, God Talk, New York: Harper & Row, 1967, p.61 (quoted by Dupre, p.51). 
49
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to itself and the God whose mystery it endeavours to prove, it has - unlike the God whom it seeks 
to understand - been inattentive to the neighbor to whom God always inclines an ear53 
The realm of religious discourse has certainly been criticized for its ontological emphasis. 
Writes Purcell, "Theology can often be undisciplined; it can seek to legitimize itself and 
take refuge in uncritical notions of revelation, in mystical encounter, or in various forms 
of fideism, all of which bypass the ethical encounter with the other person."54 
It is because of the multiplicity of others that theology must take heed. Lonergan 
emphasizes that human knowledge, of the good and otherwise, "is not some individual 
possession but rather a common fund, from which each may draw by believing, to which 
each may contribute in the measure that he performs his cognitional operations properly 
and reports their results accurately."55 In other words, one must contribute to a common 
ethical fund with responsible subjectivity - a subjectivity that is cognizant of the other. 
This is of utmost importance, for what do we consider the common fund? Who is 
included in this word, 'common'? "It is the function of culture," Lonergan writes, "to 
discover, express, validate, criticize, correct, develop, improve . . meaning and value."56 
But our very definition of culture, that is to say, who belongs to it, is a primary concern 
of ethics. If egoism is indeed "in conflict with the good of order,"57 Lonergan is quick to 
point out that "besides the egoism of the individual there is the egoism of the group... 
[and] group egoism not merely directs development to its own aggrandizement but also 
provides a market for opinions, doctrines, theories that will justify its ways and, at the 
53
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same time, reveal the misfortunes of other groups to be due to their depravity."58 Any 
group that is in power is in danger of promoting its own agenda in this way, of not being 
open to the voices of others. It is the task of critical thinker to be on guard for this, for 
any group that does this is not truly intending value. 
Language itself is complicit in this kind of egoism. When Foucault expresses 
concern over the limitation of language to signify ethics, it is because of an emphasis of 
the ontological in language. It is as if he is saying that in historical actuality, language is 
not used with this reverence of intending. Power, (in Levinas's terms, ontology), in a 
sense, subjective truth turned institution, reveals itself through discourse. Foucault 
therefore understands discourse as a tool of power that does not take the infinite (the 
Other) into account. It functions without reverence to its finitude. 
With this analysis, the critical theorist is trapped by the fact that any new 
assertion made by human reason inevitably generates a new structure of power to further 
itself, and because of both the reliance on the known, and the creation of a new known, 
language itself is complicit. By making something new true through language, we create 
a new ontology that is itself true only by a kind of closure, a seal. Language, then is not 
truly open to what lies beyond its realm. Thus, language itself is dangerous. 
This inevitability is outlined in Foucault's work in which he terms power both 
'negative' in its repressive tendency, and 'positive' in its generation of further power 
structures. In his article "The Power of Discourse: Michel Foucault and Critical Theory," 
Torbjorn Wandel writes: 
One of the extraordinary qualities of Foucault's work is the demonstration that the intellectual efforts 
that have often proclaimed themselves allies to critical theory . . . psychiatry . . . indeed the human 
sciences tout court - have often been complicitous with the structures of domination and mechanisms 
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of power they have critiqued... "New" truth quickly becomes "an alibi for the exercise of power... 
[Knowledge itself] finds itself in a "perpetuum mobile of power-generating truth claims.59 
It is through analyzing this discourse that its resisters unmask it. But the resisters 
have only discourse at hand, and, in resorting to it, they reveal their own dependence on 
these institutions. Bound by language they have only the words that have already been 
said, and if there is innovation, it is clouded by the complex web of meanings that their 
words already contain. "The pursuit of truth is not exempt from the discursive, social and 
economic context in which it is undertaken."60 "So it is," writes Bernard Lonergan, "that 
conscious intentionality develops in and is moulded by its mother tongue."61 Thus, 
language cannot be ethics if it only accounts for the old, and when it is new, it 
immediately and inevitably creates an oppressive power structure, a new ontology. 
wWandel,pp.371-.375. 
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CHAPTER 2: ETHICAL MEANING - CRISIS OR RECONCILIATION? 
LOSS OF MEANING 
We may agree that subjective perpetuation of a moral ground can have dangerous 
results, and counter the transcendent objective of true ethics. Yet the subject cannot be 
annihilated altogether by the disruption of the other, for then how do we account for 
moral reasoning, for subjective agency in moral action? Indeed, the problem perceived 
with regard to this model of 'neither-authority-nor-knowing subject' is that of a loss of 
grounding altogether. From a philosophical perspective, Kepnes explains this concern. 
"The radical critique of the rational self together with the infinite demands of the other 
could easily render that self and reason thoroughly passive. This, I would call the crisis 
of postmodernism." This concern can be compared to that of deconstruction of 
language altogether, as described by Jeffrey. Jeffrey quotes Harold Bloom who notes a 
thoroughgoing linguistic nihilism.... called Deconstruction, such as that of Derrida, in 
which there is the" dearth of meaning and absolute randomness."63 
If positive linguistic assertions of ethical knowledge are not in fact ethical in their 
use and structure, if language itself is complicit in the perpetuation of oppressiveness, 
what then is left of religious meaning? Certainly, the problem with asserting singularly 
true revelation through either Judaism or Christianity is problematic in its lack of 
openness to others, ie. non-Jews or non-Christians. But if Christ is not 'exclusive' and the 
62
 Steven Kepnes, "Ethics After Levinas: Robert Gibbs's Why Ethics? Signs of Responsibilities," Modern 
Theology 19:1, 2003, pp.103-115, p.106. 
Derrida, Paul de Man, Geoffery Hartman Deconstruction and Criticism (New York" Seabury, 1979), 
cited by Jeffrey, p. 1. 
25 
Laws of the Torah not authoritatively prescribed to a specific people, is there a loss of 
ethical meaning? Revelation is not just a tag for a group of people; it proposes allegedly 
ethical content. For both Jews and Christians this content has been a source of ethical 
inspiration and direction. 
This need not be understood only as a religious crisis. Indeed, Nietzsche's death 
of God comes alongside a philosophical panic over loss of meaning altogether such as 
can be seen in existentialism and deconstruction. Indeed, Levinas's ethics of the other has 
been criticised for annihilating the subject altogether. It is a misconception, however, to 
think that Levinas does not "offer a strong and compelling conception of the subject's 
moral agency and that his ethics, properly understood, does not entail self-abnegation."64 
In Levinas' reconstruction (rather than deconstruction) of the subject who is 
awakened to the radical alterity of the Other, is that the very notion of the good must then 
become always in question. It is the Other who puts the I in question: "Instead of 
destroying the I, the putting in question binds it to the Other in an incomparable, unique 
manner."65 Levinas's view of the Other in Otherwise than Being, is the "formation of a 
concept of selfhood defined by its openness and its capacity for discovery."66 And it is 
"in [this] me . . . that communication opens."67 What results from the encounter with the 
other is "the impossibility to come back from all things and concern oneself only with 
oneself."68 
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Thus, subjectivity is not lost, it is suspended, then re-evaluated and forced to 
continue re-evaluating in response to subsequent encounters with other Others. What one 
has, then, is "a totally new understanding of the Self. It can neither encompass itself by 
an adequate (ap)prehension or concept nor rule over itself in sovereign freedom .. 
.Human corporeality is animated by the relation of responsibility."69 
Is there a linguistic model that accounts for these elements? Between a system of 
language that points to a known, and a system of language that has no meaning at all, 
there needs to be a linguistic model that accounts for both the passivity of the subject and 
its active agency, if ethical meaning is to exist in any communicable way. Transcendence 
needs to be met with content. 
Certain philosophers, including Levinas, have indeed pointed to an ethical 
structure in language that differentiates between its transcendent and subjective attributes, 
thereby liberating it from total culpability in evading ethics. It should be noted that 
religious overtones are hard to miss in their depictions. These overtones help emphasise 
the appropriateness of allusion to divine revelation, when examining language for its 
paradoxical tension and ethical energy. 
ETHICAL STRUCTURE IN LANGUAGE 
Bruns writes: "We think of language as a system for framing representations, for 
thematizing the world, reducing the world to our propositions. But language remains 
excessive with respect to our uses of i t . . . It does not, Heidegger says, 'exhaust itself in 
signifying'. . . Like the thing and the work of art, language remains outside the world: it 
A. Peperzak, To the Other, Indiana: Purdue UP. 1993, (as quoted by Rosenthal, 2003.) 
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withholds itself."70 In other words, there is an unaccounted for in language that resists 
our grasp. This, I would say, is the 'beyond' or the 'concealed.'71 Like revelation, it 
pulls us out of ourselves and toward the other. 
The transcendental appeal of revelation noted by Heschel is understood in 
linguistic terms by Levinas, in that he calls the transcendental appeal a saying. "For 
Levinas, the other signifies the 'holiness of the holy,' the trace of the Infinite... The 
ethical Saying signifies, even before setting forth a said, a 'pure testimony' of infinite 
responsibility in which the subject opens itself to the Other in a "supreme passivity of 
exposure." Our turn to language involves a prelinguistic responsibility that is referred 
to in the relational structure of language itself. Revelation reveals this. 
This, Lee explains as a religiosity in Levinas's philosophy: "For Levinas, then, 
the ethical relation is always "out of place" in the world, other than the "ways of the 
world." . . . It is in this sense that Levinasian ethics takes on a religious sensibility or, 
more accurately, collapses the distinction between ethics and religion."73 
KNOWLEDGE AND THE TRANSCENDENT IN LANGUAGE 
"The epistemological sensibility of much of Western philosophy suggests, at least 
to Levinas, that the correlation between knowledge and being is one in which 
understanding (Auffassen) is always a gripping (Fassen), an activity which appropriates 
M. Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 5, Holzwege Frankfurt: Vittorio Klosterman, 1977, p.310, quoted by 
Bruns, "Blanchot/Levinas: Interruption (On the Conflict of Alterities), p.132. 
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and thereby frees the otherness of the Other."74 In other words, knowledge has been seen 
as a possession. This understanding finds language inadequate as an expression of any 
ultimate knowledge of 'the good', inadequate as the way in which to oppose ontology. As 
a system of signs, language from authoritarian to critical seems to offer no escape from 
the limiting of ethical truth by way of ontology and power. Wandel claims that Foucault 
was not able to overcome this linguistic pessimism, and offer "a formulation of an 
alternate notion of power."75 
Yet, if we return to Levinas, we can see an analysis of language that finds its 
transcendent and quality, its relational and ethical structure. Levinas argues that "the gap 
that safeguards the alterity of the other (as human or God), locates the ethical 
anterior/exterior to every thesis and position, free from dependence on the Logos. This 
'excess signifies as a Saying {le Dire) which opens the subject to the other before saying 
what is said {le Dit). '76 In other words, there is something in language that exists before 
the power seeking and oppressive nature of the 'said'. 
If Foucault does not confidently assert an alternate model to language as a system 
of signs, he does at least, hint at a reconsideration of it that is similar to Levinas. What he 
hints at is that beneath language there is "order in its primary state . . . a middle region 
[that] can be posited as the most fundamental level of all: anterior to words, perceptions, 
and gestures . . . Thus in every culture . . . there is the pure experience of order and its 




modes of being."77 This pure experience is not objectivity imposed as authoritative truth, 
but an underlying notion about the objectivity, so to speak, of human subjectivity.78 
This underlying notion involves mystery, a kind of silence. "Behind the visible 
facade of the system," Foucault writes, "one posits the rich uncertainty of disorder; and 
beneath the thin surface of discourse' and 'the study of discursive formations,' there is a 
'largely silent development (devenir79)... a 'prediscursive' that belongs to an essential 
silence."80 
In the relationship of silence, chaos and discourse, there is a structure that hints at 
universality in the human relationship with language. Regardless of culture or time, we 
all turn to language with those same steps. Gadamer claims that this universality implies 
an objective world of concepts of human experience, for if this were not so, translation 
would not be possible. 
But this universality does not manifest in a totality, and this is key, for totality is 
counter to ethics. Human experience, even if universal, can only be expressed in a 
particular language. This constant of experience-before-language is, in fact, not 
constant in singularity, but is characterized by diversity ("every culture.") 
In Levinas's philosophy, "vis-a-vis the world, language undergoes its customary 
reduction to propositional form... However,... the ethical relation entails a plurality of 
77
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languages."83 "Language is not reducible to a system of signs doubling up beings and 
relations. .. that is, Saying {Dire) - speaking a language - is irreducible to the Said (le 
Dit)"84 
That language can be talked about reveals something about its transcendent 
capacity. Says Bruns, "it is worth stressing that language here is not made of words... 
language is a word for, 'the relationship of proximity,' or rather this relationship is 'the 
original language, a language without words, propositions, pure communication." 
Blanchot would call this "the possibility of entering into a relationship independently of 
every system of signs common to the interlocutors. .. it is the power to break through the 
limits of culture, body, and race." 87 
RELIGIOUS OVERTONES 
This we can compare to the Divine Logos. Bruns explains: "What is it to hear 
language speaking? The sense of this question is obscured somewhat by English 
translation, which evokes the spectre of language as a Supersubject or stand-in for the 
Being of beings, whose God-like voice pursues us across some supersensible space." 
Indeed, it is difficult to avoid religious understandings of this phenomenon: 
Bruns writes, "an experience with language has all the features of a prophetic 
event in which something transcendental breaks in on us... In fact... Heidegger cites 
the story of Pentecost and the tongues of future as an example.. .the point of the citation 
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is that speaking does not originate with subjectivity but is first of all a mode of 
responsibility." 
Language, like ethics, is an event.90 It is, says Bruns, "an experience with 
language [that] means an interruption of subjectivity in which we find ourselves face-to-
face with whatever is otherwise."91 Heidegger characterizes discourse as a call. "The call 
does not originate with the subject, rather the subject is exposed to the call... .The caller 
is absolutely other. . . . Discourse here is not propositional but, let us say, invasive: 
prophetic-like it breaks in from the outside." 
Purcell compares Levinas's phenomenology to Rahner's theology. According to 
Purcell, Rahner points to the subject as the 'hearer of the word,' an "analysis of our 
capacity for hearing God's revelation."93 What we hear, truly, is through linguistic 
accounts by many hearing subjects. Rahner "is keen to stress that human religiosity is a 
part of human life which betokens a certain openness to what is other."94 
For Heidegger it seems that language is the very manifestation of ethics: 
The transcendence of words means that words do not originate here, with me, are not mine or part 
of me; they are always outside of me, raining down on me. . . Words are the presence of 
exteriority, the infinite, the elsewhere, the otherwise or non-identical as such. So the otherness of 
the other person is only brought home to me in the word that breaks in on me. . . Language does 
not unite us, as if it were a bond or a whole that contained us both; rather it separates us because it 
is itself uncontainable within any totality. It is the interruption of every union.95 
In his later writing, Heidegger understands language as "an experience [which is] 
a reversal in which language is no longer an instrument under our control." This is not a 
failure, but an event in which "the truth of language overwhelms and transforms us . . . as 
Ibid. The event of the Pentecost will be the focus of the third chapter. 
See Levinas, "Dialgoue." Gadamer too, calls language an event. See Gadamer, Truth and Method. 
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a loss of subjectivity or, better, as an invasion of the subject that deprives it of its self-
possession and self-identity."96 
"The relationship of language implies transcendence, radical separation, the 
strangeness of interlocutors, the revelation of the other to me. In other words, language is 
spoken where community between the terms of the relationship is wanting . . . It takes 
place in this transcendence. Discourse is thus the experience of something absolutely 
foreign."97 
Heidegger talks of language as a listening: "Speaking is listening to the language 
which we speak . . . a listening not while but before we are speaking" 98. 
An experience with language is an interruption; it is prophetic in its structure, except that nothing 
is revealed. It is rather that our relation with language . . . is no longer one of cognition and 
command. It is now a relation of proximity in which, although nothing is revealed, neither can be 
evaded. Heidegger speaks of the relation of poetry and thinking in terms of a movement into the 
proximity of language, where proximity means being face-to-face with others and with things. 
Think of language as the event in which this proximity occurs." 
The Saying is the 'space' in which the original call for responsibility lies. There is, 
says Levinas, an "originary relation, which he calls an "untotalizable diachrony,"100 
Notions of autonomous freedom are "anteceded by the primordial call of the other," [my 
emphasis]... Ethics redefines subjectivity as this heteronomous responsibility, in contrast 
to autonomous freedom."101 The primordial call, be it theological, is an awakening to the 
heteronomous nature of the other. In this heteronomy is the framework for human 
understanding, and from within this framework one gleans the responsibility toward the 
other. 
96
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How this inspires ethics, is explained by Levinas: "The presence of the Other 
(Autre) is a presence that teaches us something; this is why the word, as a form of 
education, amounts to more than the experience of reality.. ."102 In other words, 
language accounts for more than our subjectivity. 
We are not just hearers of the word; we are also speakers of it. "We do not 
merely speak the language - we speak by way of it."103 Through the heteronomy of 
language we communicate. "Levinas reconstructs an ethical subjectivity predicated on a-
priori heteronomy in which the subject constitutes through its being-for-the-Other."104 
Language is identified as being for the other, and thus must be linked with responsibility. 
In other words, as we assemble ourselves into speech, we are ever-responsible to others. 
"With entry of another person, the relations of signifying utterly change. A sign 
cannot be restricted to only one other person but intrinsically wanders and is directed 
toward other others."105 The third (and fourth and fifth persons) change the ethical 
dynamic from the height of authority granted to the other to a requirement for semantic 
agreement so that disputes, obligations, and responsibilities can be abjudicated." (my 
emphasis). This, Levinas calls Justice. Justice, according to Levinas, is what must be 
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This is important, for the said, the words themselves, are still of great importance. 
This is crucial for ethical theological discourse. Foucault asserts, "the prediscursive is 
still discursive.... One remains within the dimension of discourse." Language is 
necessary and inevitable especially in the occurrence of other others. 
Thus, there is both infinity and finitude in language, this dynamic simply needs to 
be illuminated and reconciled. 
RECONCILING FINITUDE AND TRANSCENDENCE - REVELATION AND LANGUAGE 
How then, is one to approach the discussion of truth and ethics, and how is one to 
promote them? This is certainly an objective of theology. What is a sound way of 
discussing revealed ethical knowledge? Is ethical religious assertion possible, or is it 
always guilty of binding and oppressing the truth? If we are bound by language, how do 
we use what we consider to be 'revealed ethics' in an ethically sound way? The 
complicity of language is a necessary point of analysis for genuinely ethical interfaith 
dialogue and education. 
For ethical sources to become revitalized and usable, and for our interpretations of 
them to be authentic and heuristic, the understanding of our finitude with regards to 
ethical knowledge and language must be regarded in some light as positive. Woloski 
rightly claims, "ethics must propose specific content as well," and " . . . Each moral 
finitude must have positive responsibility for each other finitude."108 
Implied is that the specific content of ethics is the call to responsibility for the 
right for existence and expression by the other, and that this is done by explicitly 
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accepting transcendence. In other words, ethical content itself is not a particular rule or 
dogma, a particular delineation of a righteous group, but is instead the revelation of the 
relationship between finitude and transcendence. For the sake of ethical meaning, in this 
content, "there would be the commitment to basic conditions ensuring each one's access 
and agency to act, speak, negotiate, and participate in the society that safeguards and 
makes possible just this access and these norms. The model, then, is implicitly political 
as well as ethical."109 "And also linguistic," she adds. "The rejection of metaphysical 
linguistic 'truth' does not entail the defeat of all notions of truth."110 Language is 
necessary if ethics is to be safeguarded. 
It is the belief of this author that both the Jewish and Christian paradigms of 
revelation have much to offer the question of whether any ultimate ethical meaning can 
be articulated in human language. More precisely, the ultimate ethical meaning proposed 
in this dissertation is a self-awareness of finitude in relation to the transcendent, which, I 
will show, is revealed in both paradigms, as it is revealed in language. Furthermore, I 
suggest that it is in both 'narratives' of revelation, that there is the suggested approach to 
human language that reconciles the concerns of its inadequacy. 
This reconciliation has to do with what the manner and content of divine 
revelation, which is directed at human beings, symbolically says about the relationship of 
human beings to one another. Where finitude and transcendence are the dynamic in the 
human to divine relationship, so too is it the dynamic between human being to human 
being. This is revealed in and through the metaphoric capacity of language. 
1 U 1 U . 
Ibid, p.412. 
36 
The foundational theological dynamic111 of divine versus human knowledge 
highlights an inherently metaphorical/ symbolic capacity in human language, and 
answers the ethical concern of this dissertation. It accounts for mystery and diversity, 
for the 'other.' With this mystery, a subject must approach the other on two counts, if 
she is to participate in ethical meaning. The 'other-ness' of other people, and the 'other-
ness' of the divine. The unutterability of the otherness of the divine is mirrored in form 
in inter-subjective communication. 
Revelation, both Jewish and Christian not only alludes to this by its very 
structure, it explicitly deals with language. Both form and content are "pregnant with 
119 
meaning." Heschel, for instance, emphasizes form over content, particularly to negate 
any ontological understanding of revealed knowledge: "The substance of. . . revelation, 
in HeschePs opinion, is infinite, bespeaking its expression in form alone, since it cannot 
be contained as substantive content." And "the substance of what is uncovered... is 
less significant than that one be involved in the process of continually uncovering."114 
Thus before we even consider what we say, we are called to consider why and 
how we say. These considerations form the dynamic relationality behind ethical truth. 
Safeguarding this dynamic kind of truth is the theological imperative and requires an 
investigation into how to preserve the transcendent quality of language to counter or 
balance its ontological nature, for language indeed its only medium for its 
communication. In other words, how do we use language ethically? 
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Preserving the dynamism of ethical truth requires great responsibility in language. 
It is my purpose here to show that there is not a loss of meaning, not in language and not 
in theological truth. Instead there is an approach to both that accounts for the 
subjectively finite as well as the transcendent. Theology, through the very notion of 
revelation and in the exploration of its manner of expression, calls for both openness and 
participation. This fact of revelation shows that there is something in language that 
reveals a limitation and a transcendent intention in its own self. In this self-awareness 
there is reverence for the other, the awakening to responsibility in light of the other. 
Ethically and linguistically, a balance must occur between subjective knowledge 
and what lies beyond it, if ethics is to have any meaning. "Self-transcendence," writes 
Lonergan, "is the achievement of conscious intentionality,"115 thus a model of ethical 
language must take into account both the other that we cannot know, as well as that 
which we do know, if ethical communication is to be possible at all. 
In Shira Woloski's understanding, the embrace of not-knowing, what she terms 
'moral finitude,' is not a loss of subjecthood. What takes us beyond this crisis is what 
Woloski calls a positive approach: "Disclaiming access to the absolute may be said to 
render impossible any moral position at all. Conversely, it might seem that the 
commitment to moral finitude may render impossible any sort of joint action . . . I would 
suggest that the notion of moral finitude be regarded as self-regulating."116 The self-
regulation she refers to is the new self-awareness of the subject, which understands its 
knowledge as ever incomplete, and as such, vigilantly checks its own horizons against the 




transcendental method, which understands knowledge as dynamic rather than static, and 
after every moral judgment must renew itself with continued attentiveness to new 
information. 
Linguistically, then, we are in search of a model of language that is open to 
renewal. In this way, the subject approaches ethical meaning with an awareness both of 
her desire for ethics and her humility before the moral knowledge of the other. This 
approach lends itself to truer ethical negotiation. Thus, according to Woloski, one sees 
an "ethics of negotiation and consensus rather than one of immutable principles that 
speak identically to all."117 She explains: 
Morality has often been thought to be grounded in some access to an ultimate truth, an infinite 
experience, a sublime authority with which the individual identifies and that the individual is able 
to draw upon or claim. Instead I would like to suggest that a moral position may be one that 
disclaims any such identification. Instead of grounding a moral stance in access to the absolute, 
we might define it as apositive acceptance of one's own fmitude, limitation, circumscription, [my 
118 
emphasis] What characterizes a moral position may not be identification with, or claims to 
speak from or for, any absolute authority or infinite understanding, but rather the denial of just 
such claims or possibility. It may be in our self-retraction - in our recognition of human fallibility 
and lack of total understanding - that morality resides119 
This human fallibility is defined by what cannot be grasped. What we truly know 
in ethics is that we cannot know. But, Woloski explains, "fmitude is not a defect that 
requires recovery or rescue: it is, rather, a proper and appropriate condition to be 
acknowledged and embraced.... Transcendence . . is not a realm or state one can enter. 
Instead, transcendence stands for what cannot be entered, what remains ever beyond 
118
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one's own finitude." Transcendence cannot be controlled by a subject. It is precisely 
defined by that which is out of its grasp. 
It is in this acknowledgment of the nature of transcendence that the argument for 
moral finitude takes on a religious understanding. Woloski sees this connection: "The 
idea of moral finitude may perhaps be extended toward a corollary notion of religious 
finitude... unconditional claims to authority transgress what is defining in religious 
commitment: the awe before a transcendence that one can never command or possess and 
in terms of which the self emerges as a finite person unable to - indeed forbidden from -
asserting command and possession." 
This is certainly emphasized in the Jewish account of God's revelation at Mount 
Sinai: "The content of the Decalogue is utterly plain... Yet the manner in which these 
words were proclaimed is shrouded in mystery . . . These words the lord spoke . . . out of 
the midst... of cloud.. . . Whatever specific fact it may denote, it unequivocally conveys 
to the mind the fundamental truth that God was concealed even when He revealed and 
1 99 
even while his voice became manifest, His essence remained hidden." 
In Woloski's words, "the reason to believe in God is to remember that you are not 
yourself God, that you cannot claim to see or know as He does, and above all that you 
cannot venture to enact for God or in His name what you imagine He wills or intends, 
19^ 
especially if doing so would impose on others." It is in being responsible for the other, 
not in determinately seeking God that one manages to find Him. This is in accordance to 
Levinas's thinking. As he puts it, "the word of the prophet (Isaiah 65:1). . expresses this 
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admirably. 'I am sought of them that asked not for me, I am found of he that sought me 
not'"124 
Lonergan expresses the same sentiment: "[W]e note that a religion that promotes 
self-transcendence to the point, not merely of justice, but of self-sacrificing love, will 
have a redemptive role in human society inasmuch as such love can undo the mischief of 
decline and restore the cumulative process of progress." Therefore even and especially 
in a religious context, this finitude is not to be understood negatively. Heschel proposes 
that, "the clear unambiguous will of God is not lower but higher than the mystery. There 
is meaning beyond the mystery. That is our reason for ultimate rejoicing."126 
A THEOLOGICAL AND LINGUISTIC RECOVERY 
Levinas's ethical metaphysics, argues Kosky, 'offers a way to think and speak 
about religion within the contemporary horizon of thought."'127 Kosky writes: 
Levinas's phenomenology opens the possibility of a religiosity that lives on in a postmodern or 
postmetaphysical age . . . [A] possible religiosity opens at the end of metaphysics insofar as the 
phenomenology of subjectivity describes its genesis in responsibility. There is no religion without 
responsibility . . . and Levinas's phenomenology, by uncovering the responsibility that undoes 
modern metaphysical thought, thereby saves religiosity for the postmetaphysical or postmodern 
age.128 
And further: 
Levinas's analysis of responsibility can be seen as a discourse on religion that, at least in its 
intentions, holds forth without recourse to the authority of any faith or religious tradition... [T]he 
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religiosity met in Levinas's phenomenology of responsibility is not an actual religion but the 
possibility of nonnoematic meaning of religion.129 
Indeed in his later writing, Levinas attempts to 'recover' theological themes. He 
does this by insisting that divine revelation is made manifest in the encounter with other 
people.130 For this reason, Levinas's primary image for the 'other' is the human face. He 
writes: "That glimpse of holiness is revealed in the other person, through whom alone 
one can gain access to God. In other words, ethics is 'first theology.' 131 
Purcell suggests that the study of Levinas can have positive influence on 
theology, "by offering the possibility of an ethical redemption of the ontological which is 
so prevalent in theological thinking."132 He quotes Wright: 
Neither Totality and Infinity nor Otherwise Than Being should be interpreted as theological texts. 
On the contrary, these texts are explicitly critical of the theology of 'positive religions,' and 
frequently emphasize that the Infinite is refractory to the thematizing discourse in theology. The 
apparently theological claims in Totality and Infinity can be understood phenomenologically as 
belonging to the description of the relationship between the self and a transcendent other.133 
Purcell insists that Levinas's ethics is "first theology.'134 Levinas's philosophy, then, is 
not only the possibility of an ethics-based theology, but "a new and iterative way of 
asking theological questions... which involves a visiting and revisiting of what has 
already been said in order to unsay it and to say it again." This revisiting can be 
compared to Lonergan's transcendental methodology. The prime objective is not the 
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grasping of divine knowledge, but the intention of value and the responsibility toward the 
other. 
Indeed, these questions we may ask in reference to an ungraspable divine 
knowledge, but our only method and recourse is human dialogue. Thus we must ask 
what divine revelation says about such dialogue, and we must ask what such dialogue 
says about divinity. 
Jeffrey writes that "for the typical Christian "theorist" from St. John the Divine 
and the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews to T.S. Eliot, its mediation between presence 
and absence , time and eternity, makes the word aptly suggestive of the relationship of 
God to the world, Being to being."137 He continues, "what centers Christian discourse is . 
. . a profoundly mediated theory of the "meaning of persons," to which language is 
subordinate."138 Such a reverent understanding respects the primacy of the personal other 
over the totalizing force of ontology. 
The parameters of language have helped us see that propositional language 
(language as a system of signs) falls short of the transcendental objective on two counts. 
The first is that if words refer only to already existing concepts, this jeopardizes the 
element of mystery that the unknown (God, in the case of theology) is supposed to 
possess. If the concern is with the articulation of evolving ethical meaning, which cannot 
be ontological, then language from this perspective fails. The other failure is that 
propositional language fixes a meaning without conceiving alternate meanings that other 
people, or the future, may hold. It reveals only its own cultural matrix, which is only 
identifiable with respect to that culture's past. In other words, propositional language is 
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reductive of the true dynamic of ethical meaning because it does not account for the 
relationality of the speaking subject to the future and to other subjects with different 
cultural matrixes, that from the limited horizon of the subject, only the future can reveal. 
Propositional language therefore, is reductive of ethics. 
BEYOND PROPOSITIONAL LANGUAGE - FROM SIGN TO SYMBOL 
Theologically, we see this concern in the work of Augustine. For him, "a theory 
of signs is . . . ultimately based on considerations of intention and the ordering of value." 
That is, he does not believe it is possible to elaborate a theory of signs, without first 
taking into account the sphere of the ethical (hence, a positive justification). Love for 
this system of signs should be love for the thing beyond "the channel into which the 
whole current of love flows."139 
When love doesn't flow beyond the words, when the mind doesn't rise to the 
infinite, the result is idolotrous, a worship of the text instead of the God who speaks 
through it. This is a concern in both Judaism and Christianity. Jeffery continues: "A self-
centered or self-serving (self-referential) use of signs cannot maintain an ordered 
relationship of means to end. It is bound rather to pervert and distort, and in so doing 
hinder the development of love."140 
Augustine differentiates between two types of sign relationships, one that sees just 
the sign and the signified, and one, more ethical, that sees beyond. Other scholars have 
seen this distinction as that between sign and symbol. In symbol's self-reference is the 
explicit invitation to see the mysterious beyond. Symbolic structure and its invitation 
Augustine, On Christian Doctrone, 1.22.21, quoted by Jeffrey, p.83. 
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account for and allude to the unknown. "A symbol is indeed the only possible expression 
of some invisible essence."141 In other words, symbol points to what lies beyond it, and 
therefore accounts for the unknown that the other signifies. "A symbol opens up levels of 
reality which otherwise are closed to us."142 Unlike the ontological in prepositional 
language, a symbol suggests more than one can articulate. It hints at otherness. "Symbol 
introduces us into realms of awareness not normally accessible to discursive thought.143 
Therefore, only symbols are adequate in conveying the unknowable. 
The symbolic offers relief from the paradigm of language as a system of signs, 
accounting for mystery and transcendence, or in religious terms, love. "The word of God, 
as described by dialectical theologians, has a structure similar to that which we have 
attributed to symbol. As the self-expression of the revealing God who addresses his 
creature by means of it, the word works mysteriously on human consciousness so as to 
suggest more than it can describe or define. It points beyond itself to the mystery which 
makes it present."144 
If love is the goal of ethics, the use of language must have the 'other' in its 
purpose. For ethical discourse to be ethical in achievement, it cannot claim possession of 
meaning. Symbols challenge such ontological possession by hinting at an original 
'maker' of the symbol, and by highlighting the mysteriousness this conveys. In Louis 
Dupre's analysis of symbols, he highlights a structural self-awareness. He writes, "A 
sign points to a signified, whereas a symbol points outward and inward simultaneously... 
A sign does not explain itself, whereas as a symbol shows the signified in its own 
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structure."145 Underlining this capacity, Dulles refers to Polyani, who also distinguishes 
symbols from signs. Signs are "mere indicators that point to something "focally known" 
whereas symbols point to themselves as well."146 Symbols imply self-awareness. 
If in the very concept of revelation lies an optimistic stance regarding human 
language, I suggest it is in the way that revelation models symbolic communication. It is 
the purpose of this dissertation to illuminate the parallel created by the event (or symbol) 
of God's communication to humankind to that of symbolic language and ethics. Because 
it is believed by Judeo-Christian communities that this communication was of both 
ethical intent and content, it serves the perfect paradigm to discover how ethical human 
communication should be theologically inspired, if heurism is the goal. 
Divine revelation seems to hold a metaphoric key, so to speak, that points to 
relationality. What is revealed is the relationship of fmitude and transcendence, of origin 
outside of subjectivity that is irreducible to subjective knowledge, a challenge to 
ontology. Gadamer writes that the "human word is only as a counterpart to the 
theological problem of the Word . . . but the important thing for us is precisely that the 
mystery of this unity is reflected in the phenomenon of language."147 
It is my intention here to show that both Jewish and Christian understandings of 
the revelation of Divine Word involve mystery as well as concrete human experience, 
and this is what, in essence, characterizes symbols. Both revelation into a written Torah, 
and revelation into flesh, (ie. Jesus), are symbols par excellence, of the ethical dynamic. 
This, as we shall see, is the necessary orientation if one is to relate to and responsibly use 
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the expansive ethical tradition available in the Judeo-Christian literary canon and beyond, 
as hermeneutics would propose we do. It is my intention here to show that symbol itself 
is revealing of the ethical structure, but whether religiosity begets this understanding, or 
symbolic awareness begets religiosity, I do not claim to determine. 
The symbolic realm is indeed perhaps the only understanding of language that is 
guarded against the limitation of particular truths, and therefore the most ethical manner 
in which to convey the ethical. I do not mean here that only intentionally symbolic 
language, such as poetry, is ethical. But that the manner in which the inherently symbolic 
in language functions (metaphoric capacity) can shed light on the ethical relationship. 
This in turn can provide us with an ethical methodology for how to approach a linguistic 
tradition, keeping it from freezing into oppressively ontological 'truths.' The biblical 
tradition encourages this: 
"Theory of language in the biblical tradition transvalues above all else the 
personal. . . What poetic language can do, and ought to d o , . . . is metaphorically to 
"incarnate," give verbal flesh to personal realities... In both ancient and modern 
Christian poets what remains at the center is not the word but the person's words are but 
a means of centering, philology but a love of words transcended by a higher love."148 
This higher love is the call of ethics and responsibility. Where propositional 
language clouds the very intention of it, symbolic language does not. Its meaning 
embraces the mystery of what is totally other, and yet is drawn from the very core of the 
subject's being. It is from an originary point of faith in revelation, I believe, that a 
communal, foundational understanding of ethics is based, and from which an approach to 
Jeffrey, p. 17. 
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language that protects the transcendent is developed.149 With this basis properly 
understood, I suggest, the problem of a linguistic articulation of ethical meaning is at 
least partially resolved. 
In several passages People of the Book, Jeffrey alludes to the idea that the currents of literary criticism 
stem from theological debates about the Word. The Word, Scripture, and poetry will be discussed in the 
subsequent chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3; REVELATION AND SYMBOL 
REVELATION AND RELATIONALITY 
Revelation is in a sense the revelation of relationality. Revelation encourages and 
challenges us to acknowledge what lies beyond the ontological in knowledge and in 
language. As a method, it specifically encourages us to embrace the symbolic as an 
ethical orientation. Symbol celebrates, so to speak, the polyvalent nature of its 
interpretations, which respects the otherness of other subjects who face the same symbol. 
Thus symbols highlight both relationalities, between subject and divine, and between 
subject and other subjects. 
The only way in which Jewish and Christian revelation can be discussed in terms 
of human experience, is if "the Christian [or Jewish] claim is not intended to be limited to 
specifically Christian [or Jewish] experience, interpretation, and language."150 This can 
only occur if it has a symbolic self-understanding. Such an understanding encourages 
the awareness of other symbol structures. With a symbolic self understanding, what 
constitutes revelation is not "the imagery but the structural relationships represented as 
obtaining between the revealer, the recipient, and the means of revelation." This bears 
a truth of its own that is pertinent to ethics. 
SYMBOL AND TRUTH 
Though the meaning of symbol cannot be precisely nailed down in terms of 
categorical thought and language, the symbol is not without value for the serious quest 
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for truth. This has certainly been debated, though I suggest as a result of a false, or at 
least overly strict dichotomy between truth and fiction, and a relegation of symbol into 
the latter. "There are empirically-minded instrumentalists," writes Dulles, "who contend 
that the symbolic language of religion is nothing but a useful fiction intended to evoke 
distinctive ethical attitudes. The serious pursuit of truth, on either of these theories, would 
demand an abandonment of symbolic language in favor of direct speech concerning the 
realities to which the symbols refer."153 
I would argue that where direct speech needs to be deferred to is perhaps not in 
the serious pursuit of truth but in the immediate pursuit of ethical action. But beyond the 
directives needed in an immediate situation, I intend to show that symbolic self-
awareness protects the transcendental methodology and the intention of justice that is 
behind the pursuit of ethical truth. After each action, as transcendental method would 
intend, one needs to continue to ask questions. 
It is ironic and unfortunate that the evocation of distinctive ethical attitudes should 
be deemed a failing in any sense. It is the belief of this author that this is the theological 
imperative above all else. If truth is to be equated with heurism in any way, then 
symbolic language is a perfectly legitimate tool for the communication of it. The 
distinctive mark of the symbol is not the absence of meaning but the surplus of 
meaning.154 Therefore, to reject symbol as fiction as opposed to truth misses the point. It 
is in the surplus of meaning that the 'other' of dynamic truth lies. 
For the criticism of symbol as reductive to make sense, one must understand truth 
as static and fixed. This, we have seen, compromises ethics. Ethical evocation is the 
152
 See Dulles, 131-134. 
153
 Ibid, p.141. 
154
 Dulles, p. 142. 
50 
prime objective, not a secondary byproduct, and the ultimate truth of revelation 
highlighted in this dissertation is the very dynamic of relationality that allows for ethical 
evocation to occur. Thus, a paradigm shift that regards truth as an open-ended entity 
needs to be supported, with heurism as both the focal point of interest philosophically, 
and the goal socially. If postmodernism has obliterated a clear dichotomy between 
symbolic reality and propositional truth, and if globalization and social awareness have 
made it clear to anyone who is in the least attentive, that one authoritative voice of truth 
can only be held onto through totalitarian and authoritarian methods, what is left is 
symbolic reality as mediator. This is not to be lamented; this is to be celebrated. 
Though both symbols and their interpretations will vary, what does lie constant is 
the structure of symbol - this structure itself is revelatory and heuristic. It is within the 
tenets of theological tradition that I find support for these claims. In the theological 
context, despite criticisms of reductiveness, symbolic understandings of revelation have 
been explored in depth for their ability to answer to the question of truth as dynamic and 
transcendent. It is in the dynamic of revealment and concealment, found in symbol and 
highlighted in revelation, that we are guarded against a claim of ultimate knowledge. 
Symbol and revelation both invite others to participate in meaning, striking a 
balance between finitude and transcendence. Regardless of the content, by their 
challenge to fixed meaning, symbol and revelation orient us toward a search for a 
'proper' interpretation. 
When interpretation of symbol is met with a newfound relational self-awareness, 
ethical intention is heightened, the sense of responsibility of interpretation is elevated by 
the understanding that the contribution of each subject to a collective and evolving 
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communal meaning is to be met by other contributions. As Lonergan writes, "objectivity 
i s . . . the consequence of authentic subjectivity."155 A symbolic awareness sharpens this 
sensibility. It accounts for the revealed subjectivity of each contribution, and the 
concealed subjectivities of yet-to-be revealed. The mysterious in both symbol and 
revelation, by our ethical measure, is this radically other that cannot be integrated into 
ontological consciousness. 
Our efforts to both understand ethics and articulate it, come from the desire for 
ethics, and can only manifest their worth in our responsiveness to others. It is in the 
relationship between consciousness rooted in the self and this 'ought to' that is directed 
toward the other, that we come to the ethical. 
Authentic self-hood is that which juggles both. "The sincere pursuit of truth - that 
actuality presumed to be universal, accessible, and outside the self- is the activity proper 
to a virtuous mind. That does not mean that integrity is not itself a virtue, and certainly 
not that it has not centrally to do with the self. What it does mean is that the route to 
authentic selfhood, however counterintuitive it might seem to a modernist perspective, is 
the way of self-transcendence."156 Language suggests that this is a common experience, 
expressed diversely. 
SYMBOL AND THE DIVINE WORD AS PRE-LINGUISTIC 
Gadamer explains that "despite the multiplicity of ways of speech, we are trying 
to keep in mind the indissoluble unity of thought and language as we encounter it in the 
Lonergan, p.265. 
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hermeneutical phenomenon, namely as the unity of understanding and interpretation."157 
This unity in the phenomenon of linguistic relationality. 
"Symbolic experience that comes to metaphorical expression is the primordial 
way of being human... . We live within symbol as the prelinguistic bonding of ourselves 
to the cosmos."158 Symbol, like the Word event, holds in unity meaning that is 
preverbal, before the particulars of a given tongue are concretized linguistically, as well 
as specific verbal incarnations. "God's self-communication," writes Cook, "is always 
mediated through language, the Word, for human beings, because of their embodied 
nature and historical rootedness, are symbol-making animals."159 Unlike prepositional 
language, the need for mediation is, in symbol, explicit. Thus there is a link between 
symbol and the divine word in its necessitation of ethical participation in meaning. 
THE SYMBOLIC MODEL - AN ETHICAL MANNER OF COMMUNICATION 
In order for symbols to evoke ethics, they must maintain the respect to diversity 
that their structure intended. Symbol does just this - encourages, rather than oppresses 
diversity. "The plasticity of symbol gives it a power to speak to people of different 
sociocultural situations and to assure that relevance is not lost." Dulles explains. "Since 
there can be a measure of equivalence or complementarity among diverse symbol 
systems, the symbolic mode of communication is favorable to interfaith dialogue."160 
The symbolic model in theology postulates a preference over the symbolic realm 
and is lauded by Dulles in his book Models of Revelation. According to Dulles, not only 
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is symbol more philosophically appropriate a medium to discuss divinely revealed ethics, 
it lends itself to a more practically ethical theological discourse between differing 
thinkers. That is to say that the symbolic model is preferable in articulating what is 
divinely revealed, as well as a preferable mode for inter-subjective understanding. 
I add to Dulles's analysis of symbolic theological discourse by showing what it 
reveals about the nature of human dialogue, grounding his claim for symbolic mediation 
both ethically and theologically. By uncovering that revelation by its structure is a 
symbol of symbol par excellence, and second, by highlighting that this structure is a 
match for Levinas's and Lonergan's transcendental demand of ethics, I intend to show 
how language itself is redeemed through symbolic understanding, and how one should 
therefore approach linguistic sources. 
The symbol functions ethically in several ways that parallels our relationship to 
divinely revealed ethical content and reveal the ethical demand inherent in language. 
Symbol, like language, grounds the perceiver of symbol in its subjectivity, while it 
intends and reveals transcendence. The symbol, like language, involves singularity and 
multiplicity, temporality and infinity, the known and the unknown. In all of these 
manners, symbols, like language, reveal relationality. 
An approach to language that identifies symbolic structure relieves the sense of 
linguistic inadequacy vis-a-vis ethics. "Language is polysemous simply as the human 
imagination is various at the practical level - yet polysemeity functions in relation to an 
intermediate totum integrum."161 Jeffrey refers to Augustine, who claims that "Meaning 
'Jeffrey, p. 10. 
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is dependent upon truth, and perception of truth is at once enhanced by the diversity of 
individuals]. . . and yet entirely limited by the consensus gentium.162 
There is relationality between an individual understanding and a collective 
(unified) one. If this consensus and unity is understood in terms of community (as 
Jeffrey sees it), I suggest that it must also understand itself as temporally limited. In 
other words, the totum integrum cannot see itself as complete, as its true unity, certainly 
in religious terms, is only achievable eschatologically. The Totum integrum must see 
itself as a thing in flux if it is to avoid the dangers of group ego. 
Thus, linguistically agreed upon understandings, even if achieved through 
authentic subjectivity and compiled through diversity and dialectic, are still finite in 
relation to those who have been excluded from participating in meaning, as they are finite 
in relation to future understandings. 
LANGUAGE AS MEDIATING BETWEEN FINITUDE AND TRANSCENCDENCE 
The intention of communication reveals an ethical relationship even before the 
infusion of particular content. But particular content is still necessary for meaning to 
occur. What must remain clear is that common verbal content does not eradicate 
otherness.164 If group egoism can be avoided with a symbolic self-understanding the 
symbolic capacity of language must be investigated. 
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Between a first set of terms such as knowledge, essence, and identity, 
(modernism) and a second set of terms such as unknowability, rupture and difference, 
Gibbs suggests "a third set of terms, a mediating set of terms. The mediating third is not 
meant as some kind of Hegelian synthesis into yet another comprehensive totality; but the 
third is characterized by the act of mediating itself... into dialogue. . And the vehicle of 
this mediation is the very tool of mediation and that is language."165 The act of 
mediation through language is an act of responsibility for the other. 
Like Woloski, "Gibb's turn to language is . . . a way of understanding those 
responsibilities as intricately caught up in and communicated through the web of human 
signifcations. Therefore, Gibbs begins with Levinas on speech and language in Totality 
and Infinity: "The relation of being spoken to, of attending to the other comes through 
words, but also shows me a speaker. And while the words may be familiar to me . . . the 
other speaker retains their fundamental foreignness."166 
"Insofar as my commerce . . . is conducted in language, I already realize that my 
fellow human beings possess an alterity that cannot be absorbed into the totality of my 
being. I realize that the meanings of my utterances depend not just on me but also on my 
interlocutors."167 In Levinas's words, "the relationship of language implies 
transcendence, radical separation, the revelation of the other to me."16 
This understanding of the relationship of language, which holds religious 
overtones, is parallel in structure and function to symbol. Discourse involves a universal 
if not eternal state of being in an ordered system of relations. It involves, too, the 
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disorder and mystery of the presystematic. But, fundamentally, there are the words 
themselves in their specific time and place. 
Gadamer writes: "The external word - is tied to a particular tongue (lingua).169 
The fact that the verbum is spoken differently in different languages, however, means 
only that it cannot reveal itself through the human tongue in its true being."170 In other 
words, the particularity of different human languages proves the inadequacy of each to 
reveal ultimate truth. But the fact that this particularity is relational to the infinite is a 
positive one. "It is the marvel of the voice [of God]," writes Heschel, "to speak to man 
according to his capacity. It is the marvel of the voice to split up into seventy voices, into 
seventy languages, so that all the nations could understand."171 
Gadamer explains that "the multiplicity in which the human mind unfolds itself is 
not a mere fall from true unity and not a loss of its home. Rather, there has to be a 
positive justification for the finitude of the human mind, however much this fmitude 
remains related to the infinite unity of absolute being."172 The "essential inexactness" 
found in the human variety of human words, "can be overcome only if the mind rises to 
the infinite."173 Thus language must be understood as containing both the particular and 
alluding to the infinite. In this tension is the ethical energy that is found in symbols. 
ETHICAL ENERGY AND THE ROLE OF SUBJECTIVITY 
Other than the fact that symbols account for the unaccountable, and unfold in a 
dynamic manner much like the way in which Levinasian ethics of the other does, and 
much in the way Lonergan's dynamic structure of knowledge does too, the symbol is 
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further lauded for its capacity to evoke ethical action. It does so by revealing our socio-
historical context and its limitation with regard to the infinite other. Both are necessary, 
for ethical action demands subjective involvement in determining meaning, but also 
appeals to what is most eternally human in the subject in order to do this: 
Symbolic representation includes totally irrational elements which refuse to obey the laws of 
logical thinking . . . since this resolution is of primary importance in the actualization of the self, 
the symbol wields an enormous power in the 'psychic development of the self... the symbol 
indicates for consciousness what ought to become."4 [my emphasis] 
"Symbolism has a powerful influence on commitments and behaviour... It stirs 
the imagination, releases hidden energies in the soul, gives strength and stability to the 
personality and arouses the will to consistent and committed action."175 I emphasise here 
that it is not simply a matter of inspiring content, but is content in the context of relational 
structure. There is what I would call ethical energy in the symbolic capacity that exists in 
language that shapes the notion of the 'ought to.' 
The symbol reveals a structure parallel to that of Levinasian ethics, which 
emphasizes a disruption of the subject's horizon. A subject vis-a-vis a symbol, is altered. 
This does not, however, leave the subject thoroughly passive. There is passivity in the 
sense that one first perceives a symbol, as one first hears language, and must contend 
with it before assembling a sense of meaning. This passivity, however, must be followed 
by a gathering of the subject's selfhood into action or speech. For this agency to be 
ethical, it must acknowledges the finitude of its knowledge and of the other's radical 
alterity, the other being both the symbol itself, and its full potential meaning as to be 
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revealed by others. If such agency were not possible, ethical action would never arise 
from this disruption. 
Indeed, symbols and revelation demand our involvement. "To enter the world of 
meaning opened up by the symbol we must give ourselves; we must not be detached 
observers but engaged participants." Symbols impose "demands on the subject to 
1 77 
pursue [their] meaning as a clue to the nature of reality." 
But how does this ethical meaning actually come through in dialogue? How do 
subjects enter into conversation when there is such stark realisation of the other? The 
same loss of meaning that is feared in the move away from ontology is feared if the 
symbol is rendered meaningless by its over-determination. 
Dulles writes, "The word as analyzed by many dialectic theologians can leave 
God completely uninvolved in human history and experience, while faith as interpreted 
by some . . . can seem to subordinate the divine initiative in revelation to the human 
\ 7R 
experience of expansion of consciousness." The notion of the intender of symbol, like 
the notion of divine initiative, is another clue that we are not dealing with ontological 
knowledge. But it is also a clue that our participation in meaning is necessary. 
God's initiative is alluded to frequently in Heschel's writing. For instance, 
"Revelation means that the thick of silence which fills the endless distance between God 
and the human mind was pierced, and man was told that God is concerned with the 
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affairs of man; that not only does man need God, God is also in need of man... the word 
of God entered the world of man."179 
PARTICIPATION IN ETHICAL MEANING 
Revelation according to Heschel was an event to God and an event for man.180 In 
order for this revelation to have meaning for man, it has to enter into the realms of man, 
namely, language and history. The interplay between ' other-worldy' knowledge, 
language and history is highlighted both by Heshcel regarding revelation, and in our 
symbolic understanding. 
Heschel writes that in the fact of revelation, "truth is not timeless and detached 
from the world but a way of living and involved in all acts of God and man. The word of 
God is not an object of contemplation. The word of God must become history. Thus, the 
word of God entered the world of man; not a . . . concession of the mind, but a perpetual 
event, a demand of God . . ."181 
With this in mind, history is no longer an enemy of ethics, but a partner. The 
historicity of moments, or at least the articulation thereof, does not just trap and bind 
segments of truth within a context that is necessarily deemed limited in scope by future 
critics. A more metaphorical understanding of these historical events can allow for a 
dynamic, rather than static self-understanding. It is this, I argue, that is the primary 
imperative that revealed ethics pronounces. 
Thus, identity and history need not be shackles if they acquire a symbolic self-
awareness. With symbolic self-awareness, identity and history take on the responsibility 
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of being rendered useful for ethical betterment. Acquiring symbolic self-awareness is, in 
essence, an awakening to creativity. Theologically, this is the divine gift to human kind. 
Symbols, like revelation, invite participation of the subject in meaning. History and 
identity are what each subject has to offer to the creative process. Symbolic awareness 
spans across these offerings. In other words, it highlights the creativity of other subjects, 
and is therefore the spirit of transcendence. 
Ethical creativity binds subjective contribution with the responsibility imposed by 
the other. Writes Heschel, "the prophet's personality i s . . . a unity of inspiration and 
experience, invasion and response. For every object outside him there is a feeling inside 
him, for every glimpse of truth he is granted, there is a comprehension he must 
achieve." This is to say that, like symbol, revelation is not created by us alone, yet it 
demands our active comprehension. 
CONCRETE EXPERIENCE 
It is in the particular event of history that any meaning can take shape. Cook 
agrees: "True universality always appears in intense particularity."183 The eternal must 
come into contact with the present moment of human history. History mediates the 
mystery of the divine. This mystery is an important feature of ethics, for it is mystery 
that "ultimately lies in God's intention and power, but mediately in human history and 
experience." 
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That means that though on the one hand, knowledge of the Good is mysterious 
and unattainable, its manifestation is always concrete. It is for this reason, I believe, that 
Levinas insists over and over on the primacy of the face. The face, I believe, is the 
metaphor for the particular event of a particular ethical challenge. A subject facing a 
symbol has a similar challenge. 
Dupre describes this process: 
The mind must slowly and painfully raise itself out of the ever-flowing stream of sensations. The 
flux must be halted and certain data must be given a representational function. Before the mind 
synthesizes impressions into units there is only an inexhaustible totality. It is not a passive 
association process, but an active grasp. Kant refers to this as the "synthesis of imagination."185 
Religiously, one can see a parallel. Indeed, God works "from within the creative 
process (which should be understood as a unitive, dialogic process of divine initiative and 
human response). But his model cannot stand without giving priority to the divine 
initiative."186 The latter part of this statement is crucial because it is the unknowable 
other of God invading upon us that initiates the process, much like the face in Levinas's 
analysis. 
"A theory of revelation . . must hold in tensive unity absolute transcendence, the 
gift character of revelation, and complete immanence, the gift as always mediated 
through human experience and human language." Furthermore, prophetic words are 
never detached from the concrete, historic situation. Theirs is not a timeless, abstract 
message; it always refers to an actual situation. The general is given in the particular, and 






Cook continues: "There is no substitute for one's own experience (immediate in 
the sense of personal appropriation), yet experience is transmitted (mediate in the sense 
of tradition). The complexity of human experience demands that we keep in tensive unity 
both concentrated event (concrete, intensive), and unfolding process (universal, 
extensive)."189 
Heschel writes: 
Revelation is an event that does not happen all the time but at a particular time, at a unique 
moment in time... The creative man is he who succeeds in capturing the exceptional and 
instantaneous before it becomes stagnant in his mind. In the language of creative thinking, 
whatever is alive is unique. And true insight is a moment of perceiving a situation before it freezes 
into similarity with something else.190 
That is to say, the emphasis on the concrete event of ethics needs to be permanently 
engaged in relation to the processional nature of knowledge. Such process transcends the 
particular moment by invoking both past and future. 
TEMPORAL RELATIONALITY 
Symbols, like revelation, are an invitation to reinvent or redefine one's 
subjectivity in response to the given moment, but this is not done without a foundation. 
"Sacred history," Heschel explains, "may be described as an attempt to overcome the 
dividing line of past and present, as an attempt to see the past in the present tense."191 
Without this ability, we cannot put sacred history into contemporary ethical action. 
Temporality and sociality here play the role of imbuing symbols with historical 
meaning. In both the history of symbol making and the history of their interpretations, 
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there lies a fundamental dependence on the existence of a contemporary horizon. This is 
true of language. Given that these horizons shift, the longevity and universality of certain 
symbols, like the longevity and universality of a vast array of linguistic concepts, says 
something in itself about truth. 
Heschel writes, "It is, indeed, one of the peculiar features of human existence that 
the past does not altogether vanish, that some events of hoary antiquity may hold us in 
the spell to this very day. Events which are dead, things which are gone can neither be 
sensed nor told. There is a liberation from what is definitely past. On the other hand, 
there are events which never become past." 
"The present "moment," Cook writes, "if isolated from the ongoing movement of 
experience for the sake of analyses, is an abstraction from the "inherently durational" 
character of human experience.... [T]here is a continuing dialectic between past, present, 
and future. The future is not so much a matter of prediction as it is of new possibilities 
that are opened up through a deeper appropriation of what is most authentic in the 
heritage of the past."193 
How we determine whether a particular symbol is 'dead' or whether it is viable in 
the present and future must be done with the utmost respect to the ethical other. "A vital 
religious faith must find expression in the world in which modern man must live. To rest 
religion on events which cannot be repeated means to isolate it from the daily experience 
of man today."194 Heschel's approach to Torah is similar: "The Torah can never become 
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past; that day {it was received} is this day, every day. The Torah, whenever we study it, 
must be to us "as if it were given us today."195 
Contemporary reality involves such a plurality of voices, that for religious ethical 
expression to remain vital it must be communicated in a non-exclusionary manner. It is, I 
suggest, the symbolic realm of language that allows for religious vitality to transcend 
cultural and temporal boundaries. If divine revelation is an example of a surviving and 
vital symbol, it maintains its duration by its ability to engage new subjects in meaning. 
This gift is both initiated from outside of the subject, and comes to meaning through the 
engaging mind of the situated subject. Revelation is not of the past alone. "The journey 
with God includes both memory that preserves past identity (and so can be "dangerous") 
and imagination that opens up new and unforeseen possibilities for the future. It is 
narrative in form, but each story has universal import."196 The import is the evocation of 
mystery and the ethical dynamic this highlights. 
Cook writes: 
Symbol has the power to evoke mystery because it addresses itself to the whole person - to the 
imagination, the will, and the emotions, as well as to the intellect, and because it is deeply rooted 
in human experience and human history. One cannot simply invent true symbols. They emerge 
from the depths of human consciousness, both individual and collective, and they last as living 
symbols as long as they continue to evoke those depths.197 
METAPHOR AS TEMPORALLY RELATIONAL 
For revelation to survive, to continue to evoke those depths, it must understand 
itself symbolically. First, each time it encounters a new interpreter, it must allow for the 
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new meaning that stems from the interpreter's temporal context. Perrin discusses 
metaphor, that is, verbal symbol, as a "dynamic structure of experience," and investigates 
"the functional role of metaphor in achieving coherence between an individual's 
mnemonic heritage (the available remnants of a lived history) and the current disposition 
of a developing occasion as they engage as complementary constituents of 
experience."198 This is key for it comes in opposition to a model of language that only 
reveals the historical (the signified), without leaving room for the new. Thus, when 
revelation is understood in light of metaphor, the derivation of meaning is dependent on 
the present as it is dependent on the past. 
Dupre highlights the evocative nature of symbol, its innovativeness, its ability to 
account for the new. "A symbol never simply refers to a pre-existing reality; it opens up 
a new one.. ., the original reality undergoes a fundamental transmutation."199 Perrin 
explains: "Metaphor is examined from an experiential perspective and its structure is 
metaphorically revealed [my emphasis] to consist of (a) a verbal vehicle signifying an 
abstract mnemonic perspective, (b) a verbal tenor referring to a concrete existential 
phenomenon, (c) an ongoing sense of occasion, and (d) an immediate context of possible 
stimulation."200 
We may take metaphor to mean, "a fundamental organizmic strategy by which 
individuals are empowered to construe a world at large beyond the phenomena of 
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experience." 01 Schon distinguishes a tradition in metaphor research that shows metaphor 
as "a revelation of a . . . fundamental process of mind organizing reality according to a 
certain perspective... generating new ways of seeing an old world... This is 
accomplished by transferring or carrying over (meta-pherein) a perspective appropriate 
to one province of experience to another in which its use is unconventional. In this sense, 
metaphor becomes an instrument of interpretation by which we employ familiar means to 
constitute meaning in an unfamiliar setting."202 
"Metaphor is born in experience."203 Metaphor, "emerges out of the tension 
between conventional expectations and actual configurations of phenomena, as a re-
visioning by which phenomena and schematic perspectives are rendered more fitting to 
one another as complementary aspects of experiential possibility. If perception "gives a 
past to the present," metaphor is a special kind of perception that supplies not a 
conventional or impersonal past, but a highly original significance to a problematic 
moment of existence."204 
Metaphor is a "circumstantially relevant effort to make sense under pressure, a 
venture of meaning in a trying situation. This suggests that poets . . . and other 
perpetrators of metaphor live unconventional and stressful lives . . . are a troubled lot, 
dissatisfied with conventional answers to traditional issues in their field. They see 
problems where others do not, and take the risk of posing new metaphors as a creative 
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step toward their solution. Thus metaphor represents the leading edge of experience, its 
interface with the unknown." 
"The function of metaphor is to draw attention to an anomaly in experience in 
such a way that it becomes an issue, a question for investigation or for further action... It 
. . . serves to define the leading edge of accepted knowledge, providing a kind of 
whetstone against which to test allegiance to authorized belief. It has a provocative, 
heretical quality that is always signed and dated . . . by the author in whose experience it 
first takes form." "Authors of verbal metaphors . . are directly accountable to . . . their 
unique heritage of ideas."207 
Metaphor has been identified as "a method for discovering latent possibilities 
within the given."208 All of these analyses demonstrate that metaphor involves the 
situatedness of a subject within a social and temporal reality, as well as the transcendence 
beyond it. Perrin explains, "[metaphor] originates as an appropriate response to an 
episode of stress within one individual's stream of experience and, once expressed in 
symbolic terms, serves to challenge the credulity of a larger community."209 
"Metaphor is a ramification of tension between expectation and fulfillment."210 
In the expectation of fulfillment, lies the mystery of the other. Thus, a metaphor opens up 
a new reality in that it makes one aware of a reality beyond its own. It forces the 
admission of incomplete understanding, and in this gap there is room for the suggestion 
of others. Symbols "draw life from multiplicity of associations, subtly and for the most 
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part subconsciously interrelated . . . and tap into a vast potential of semantic energy, [my 
emphasis]"211 The vast potential, is essentially the 'Other.' Its meaning is irreducible to 
onto logical knowledge. It is both a question of the other as neighbour, and the other as 
the future, that must make us humble before the notion of ultimate meaning, yet active 
participants in an ethical articulation. 
Perrin continues, "[T]he practitioners of a specific discipline bear responsibility 
for monitoring the effects their beliefs and activities have on those who do not possess a 
similar set of metaphorical ways of construing reality.... The alternative is to declare 
one system of metaphor prime... The course of human history can be seen as a sequence 
of just such clashes of perspective . . . We are not progressing toward some fixed 
asymptote of truth and virtue. In every empire, in every age, all we discover is a limited 
range of views... We will wend our way into the 21st century, as always, condemned to 
our perspectives, but by them also challenged to explore the range and implications of 
919 
our most favored metaphors." He continues, "Metaphor is . . . a practical calculus by 
which . . . we attempt to arrive at a meaningful sense of our situation and its direction. 
And when it has done its job we .. .move on, marshalling our possibilities by a method of 
successive approximation, trying to see through our symbols to a world beyond."213 
If the makers of metaphor, those who use language creatively, are relentless in 
their challenge to ontology it is because they are applying transcendental methodology to 
their discourse, the heart of which is inquiry, and the motto of which is subjective 
finitude. They create a question whilst leaving their distinct socio-temporal mark. It is 
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upon these inquiry-inspiring encounters that their task takes the shape of ethics. Perhaps 
for this reason metaphor, like revelation, has been identified as a "deliberately heuristic 
proposition of world order." 
Indeed, as stated earlier, ethics demands that the totum integrum of revelatory 
meaning be seen both as social as well as temporal. This consensus is itself relational to 
an untotalizable truth, which is, the divine and eschatalogical, or some philosophical 
notion of a culmination of the future. Indeed, temporality here is key, for if language is 
an account of both limited subjectivity and the absolute unknown subjectivity of others, 
its meaning is dependent on time and the speaking of new others, in order for its meaning 
to reach any fullness. If "mystery connotes the inexhaustible and limitless character of 
"knowledge-in-process,"215 mystery in language is the future meanings it holds in 
potentiality. Heschel writes: "The chain of causality and of discursive reasoning, is fixed 
in the space of endless possibilities like the tongue hanging in a silent bell. It is as if all 
the universe were fixed to a single point. In revelation the bell rings, and words vibrate 
through the world."216 
It is perhaps with eschatological fervor, that is, an ethical impetus that 
acknowledges mystery in relation to an ultimate end, that creative people are inspired to 
use language metaphorically. Revelation in essence reveals metaphor by revealing 
fmitude, transcendence and creativity in its use of language. Revelation, like the use of 
metaphor, is ethical because it intends its meaning to be open to the newness of the other. 
In the transfer of this meaning, in the perpetuation of symbol for the sake of future others, 
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there is dependence on the yet-known interpreters who will add still further perspectives 
for understanding. Metaphor essentially links the past with the present and future 
through language.217 
217
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CHAPTER 4: REVELATION AND TEMPORAL RELATIONALITY -
ESCHATOLOGICAL ETHICS 
REVELATION AS INNOVATIVE 
The ethical analysis of metaphor is strikingly similar to Heschel's understanding 
of temporality in his analysis of revelation. "Revelation," he writes, "is not an act of 
interfering with the normal course of natural processes but the act of instilling a new 
creative moment into the course of history."218 Revelation "is always a radical challenge 
to contemporary images of God .. .[RJevelation is a metaphoric act, the creation of new 
9 1Q 
possibilities." 
Though Heschel writes that, "the moment of revelation must not be separated 
from the content or substance of revelation," he also suggests that the content itself is 
its form, ie. relationality itself. The content of revelation highlights the capacity for 
innovation from within a cultural heritage. 
Cook writes that "the question of revelation is . . . a question of truth... [I]t is a 
question of the interrelationship of propositional truth, historical truth, personal truth (in 
the sense of direct experience, whether immediate or mediated), transcendent truth, and 
immanent truth." He suggests that in the case of revelation, the new creative moment 
was the insight into the interplay between temporality and the transcendent. "In contrast 
to magical attempts to control the Deity through knowledge of the Name, Israel's God is 
free, absolutely transcending human attempts to control Him, able to be known only in 
218
 Heschel, p.211. 
219
 Cook, p.396. 
220
 Heschel, p.217. 
221
 See Schorsh, p. 
222
 Cook, pp.390-391. 
72 
the actual unfolding of Israel's story in the process of history. This was truly a revolution 
993 
in human consciousness." This is of key importance, for human history indeed unfolds, 
and therefore one cannot claim at any point in time to have full knowledge. In its form 
and content, revelation, like symbol, rejects ontology. Cook explains that, "although a 
variety of images may be used . . . root metaphor implies that there is a basic or dominant 
analogy in terms of particular structural relationship."224 Like in metaphor, the dominant 
analogy in revelation is the interplay between self-awareness and radical otherness. 
The symbolic/metaphoric embraces all of these. It emphasizes the capacity of 
language to reveal, not a fixed ultimate truth, but an evolving truth, which is revealed in a 
perpetual way. This revelatory nature occurs because of a structural self-reference that 
involves awareness of finitude, and also because of a capacity, or more importantly, an 
intention to be open to other horizons. In other words, metaphor makes this invitation 
explicit. Symbolic language is meant to evoke self-awareness of one-self as a non-
knower by evoking the knowledge that it will inevitably be understood differently by 
different people, in different times. Symbolic language at once accounts for the 
timelessness of linguistic structure, the particularity of one's time and place, and the 
awareness of others, in other times and places. 
There is both this creativity and the transcendent objective in divine revelation. 
Like the poet, according to Perrin's analysis, so too the Christian "prophet brings that 
past into the present in new unforeseen ways and so creates new possibilities for the 
future. This is what Jesus did as a prophet to Israel."225 "Jesus, as prophet to Israel, 
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employed the root metaphor, 'Kingdom of God' but invested it with a metaphoric 
meaning that was intended to challenge the expectations of his contemporaries in the 
light of what was deepest and best in the heritage of Israel." "The ability to identify the 
kingdom with these unfamiliar and unforeseen images provides a shock to the 
imagination that reveals new and creative possibilities of seeing and acting for those who 
are willing to enter m." 
This last notion of willingness is the reflection of true dialogue, for as both 
speakers and listeners, dialogue involves the will to enter into it. Both as creators of 
metaphors and interpreters of them, we are engaged in the very dynamic of our finite 
selves and the infinity of the other. This is why metaphoric revelation reflects an ethical 
dynamic. In Truth and Method, Gadamer writes that "understanding or its failure is like 
an event that happens to us.. . and the language in which it is conducted bears its own 
truth within it - i e . . . it allows something to "emerge" which henceforth exists,"227 yet, 
"no one knows in advance what will 'come out' of a conversation." In the henceforth 
(past), we see the will, in the moment (present) and the unknowability of future 
understanding, the other plays a predominant role, and it is in this that the link to 
transcendent ethics is made. 
The fusion of horizons that metaphor involves is essentially the concept of 
hermeneutics. Indeed, though artistic, or intentionally literary language will be explored 
for the ethical intentionality that goes into writing and reading poetic text, it will be 
shown that any written text bears the same relational structure that accounts for the 
subject, and the other. 
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THE WRITTEN WORD 
It is not to understand the writer that the reader intends, but to understand the text. 
Therefore, "understanding is . . . not concerned with 'understanding historically,' -ie. 
reconstructing the way the text came into being."229 Though the temporal situatedness of 
the author is of interest (certainly in exegesis), a text is of ethical significance (and by 
that I mean it can inspire or initiate ethical action in its readers) when it is understood 
within the context of the reader. 
McEvenue points out that for both Gadamer and Derrida, "giving to [a] text a life 
independent of historical authors," is a necessity.230 However, this does not mean 
disregarding the historicity of both the authors of sacred texts and their interpreters. 
Exploring the life of the author and of various readers, essentially the work of biblical 
scholars, sheds transcendental light in that this reveals our own historicity as readers. 
This awareness can inspire a heightened self-awareness that emphasises our own 
temporal finitude - a key component of ethics. Thus any derivation of truth we may 
come to, enhanced by historical analysis, can be measured as ethical only in relation to 
what lies beyond our realm, in the not yet revealed. 
It should be noted that Levinas prioritises orality and the face of the other over 
written language.231 For the theologian, however, the written language of scripture is 
held in ethical regard, and therefore must be addressed. Here we can defer to Derrida, 
who, commenting on Levinas, asserts that "the writer better renounces violence, because 
he cannot control the use of his signs... In order to renounce violence, to signify 
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responsively, it is better to perform the lack of control over signs. Indeed, writing here is 
differerance [sic], the recognition that meaning lies ahead, indeed after my ultimate 
absence."™ 
The written word and ethics are inextricably linked. "Writing is central to the 
hermeneutcial phenomenon insofar as its detachment both from the writer or author and 
from a specifically addressed recipient or reader gives it a life of its own. What is fixed 
in writing has raised itself into a public sphere of meaning in which everyone who can 
read has an equal share." 
In the interplay between text and reader, it is evident that the text is not 'dead' as 
Levinas would have it, though I certainly do not argue the primacy of the face-to-face 
encounter. It is the face-to-face encounter that challenges us to return again and again to 
our texts with the voice of the new other in mind. 
According to Gadamer, "it belongs to every true conversation that each person 
opens himself to the other," and he sees this as true in the reading of a text. He 
continues: "the text is a fixed expression of life that is to be understood; and that means 
that one partner in the hermeneutical conversation, the text, speaks only through the other 
partner, the interpreter. Only through him are the written marks changed back into 
meaning."234 
He adds, "the understanding of something written is not a repetition of something 
past but the sharing of a present meaning." "A written tradition is not a fragment of a 
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past world, but has already raised itself beyond into the sphere of meaning that it 
expresses." 
I add here the emphasis that beyond the present meaning there will be new, other 
readers who fuse their horizons as well. Because there is no pause in the linearity of 
history, the potential meaning of a written tradition is in constant expansion. "To acquire 
a horizon of interpretation requries a fusion of horizons . . . [TJhere cannot, therefore, be 
any single interpretation that is correct "in itself."237 
What McEvenue describes is very similar to how Gadamer understands the 
temporality of textual conversation. He writes, "in speaking of meaning, it is helpful to 
distinguish . . . meaning as it occurs in the text, which is derived from the author and 
what lies behind him, and meaning as it occurs in the reader... This discussion . . . 
intends to designate a range of awareness stretching from merely potential awareness on 
the one hand, all the way to full but implicit awareness of the other." 
THE BIBLE 
What McEvenue describes as a spiritual foundation of the biblical reader is 
expressed clearly in the example of what he calls the subliminal meaning of "let there be 
light." It is not "a doctrine of creation, much less an explanation of the origin of light' 
rather it is a personal sharing of the Priestly Writer's faith in God's limitless power to 
illuminate the dark."239 McEvenue dichotomizes here in an effort to highlight the 
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spiritual intentionality of the writer, and the spiritual orientation of the reader. Yet in 
doing so, he is offering his own interpretation. 
None of these are wrong per se. "Let there be light" can mean, and has meant all 
of these things. What I argue is that there is a need for a methodology which captures 
this spiritual foundation of the act of writing and reading itself, the meaning of ethics 
which is encapsulated in the will to communicate and the will to understand. If this 
spirituality wants to claim itself ethical, it requires a methodology that bases itself on an 
understanding of transcendental ethics. Any reading that does not do this is by nature 
reductive of the ethical imperative, and is therefore distorting to the very spirituality 
intended. 
The pertinent question in theology, then, is not just how one should embrace 
finitude, unattainability and ethical humility in the search for truth, but also how one 
should do so when approaching sacred texts. Writes Dulles, "By virtue of [its] symbolic 
dimension, the revelatory language of Scripture is capable of grasping and transforming 
the responsive reader." 4 
Consider metaphor as an event. Perrin: "Each metaphor is a tentative solution to 
an experiential problem or enigma. As Ricoeur pointed out, "the metaphor is not the 
engima but the solution to of the enigma." 241 It is a conquest, a revelation,242 a 
reorganization or refocusing of experience."243 
Now consider McEvenue's description of artistic affirmation of truth: 
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One assembles sounds and images and notions and narrative, and plays with them until they 
finally express what one has been trying to grasp, that is, until they finally enable one to express 
preconceptually, elementally, what one has already understood in a heretofore mute insight. The 
reader, in turn, grapples with this artistic product, its elements and logic and omissions and 
contrasts until a unified understanding occurs. Thus the work incarnates as elemental meaning the 
artist's insight, and provides an object in which the reader can share that insight.244 
This temporal dynamic, enlightened by a theological understanding of revelation, has 
lead to an approach to readership of scripture, with the intention of preserving the ethical 
dynamic. For this to occur, the text is not approached as authority to adhere to, but as an 
example of ethical inspiration and intent, which is initiated by the experience with the 
other and is expressed for the sake of the other through the medium of language. 
McEvenue encourages a readership of scripture that approaches it as literary. 
Literary genres are particularly appropriate in conveying dynamic ethical truth because, 
writes, McE venue, "literature is a way of writing in which the subjective stance of the 
writer shapes and controls an inquiry to which the resulting poem, or story, or speech, or 
letter, is a unique answer."245 Yet this answer contains further inquiry. Symbolic 
language makes this explicit. Literary language overtly invites the subjectivity of the 
reader to come into play. Poetic affirmation is appropriate to ethics because it is not 
about objectified truths, "but rather about subjective states of expectation."246 It is not 
surprising, then, that the poetic realm is of great interest and reference in Gadamer's 
investigations. 
"Literary affirmation is . . . often subtly conceived through ellipse and allusion 
and juxtaposition and sound and image in such a way that it cannot be expressed in any 
other words than those of the unique poem, or story, or exhortation, and so forth... 
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Commentary should never presume to carry that burden itself. It should enable the reader 
to hear, once again, the song which rose in the heart of the biblical writer. It should place 
the reader in the best location to hear and see. And it should stop there."247 
McEvenue compares biblical and poetic inspiration in his argument against 
scripture as authority. He does so in an attempt to ground claims of authority in text, 
namely scripture, without falling into the trappings of dogma. He focuses on the 
converting power of text and on its inherent call for openness toward the other. He writes, 
"We shall attempt to show that what the text does to us is determined by an unnamed, 
unarticulated, and very elusive "speaker" who addresses us from the text... and in effect 
exercises subliminal authority. Second, we shall point to one kind of unarticulated 
message of that speaker, which will be present in each text, and which will be normative 
and important theologically. This kind of message we shall call "spirituality."248 
"SPIRITUAL" READERSHIP 
Fundamental to McEvenue's understanding is the appreciation of mystery and 
transcendence that poetic and prophetic work entail. This transcendent mystery, 
potentially common to all texts, is a symbolic awareness which provides an ethical 
orientaiton. When we enter into dialogue, we enter it with both capacity and desire to 
transcend, and if the nature of language impedes us, it also grants us with the tool and 
framework for our efforts. 
McEvenue writes: "Now the Bible's authority is not that of the letter of the law. 




precise aspect of biblical meaning exercises authority? We have ruled out original 
articulated meaning and later expressed intra-biblical interpretations, because these never 
have been normative Has the authority of Scripture been applied, not to what 
Scripture said, but rather to what the texts do to the reader without our adverting to its 
influence? Should we look to affects rather than ideas? To conversion rather than truths? 
The answer must be "yes" in some degree, no matter how painful such an admission may 
be to scholars trained for exact definitions, and for objective data."249 
This is a blessing, rather than a curse. The content of scripture itself alludes to 
this converting capacity and to this anti-dogmatic capacity, both because of its frequent 
poetic register, and its frequent internal references to writing, the role of inspired scribe, 
text preservation, etc.250 The idea herein is that revelation models a dynamic and 
transcendent structure rather than one historical moment of revealed ontological 
knowledge, and therefore the use of text, rather than the contents of a specific text, takes 
ethical precedence. 
A methodology of scriptural readership that is in fact transcendental, (ie. ethically 
responsible) is one that takes the symbolic dynamic into account. McEvenue provides the 
example of Exodus 15 - in which God will melt the heart of the enemy before a battle. 
He asks, "What spirituality is carried out by the text? In what realm is God expected to 
appear?" Certainly, it depends on the reader. He explains, for instance: 
If one focuses on the Pentateuchal editor-author, then one might think of a concrete Zionist hope: 
God will intervene when the Jews are restored to Jerusalem. However, the distancing of the text 
from historical reality could justify less sharply defined expectancies: God will be expected to 
intervene in any Jewish community facing persecution or to save his Church at odds with any 
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secular power, and so on. . . In meditating on these images, one . . . is invited to apply them to any 
concrete circumstances of his or her own life and times.252 
What is common to all of these is that God will intervene in some facet that is 
recognizable to the community that names Him their God. The unknown source of 
benevolence will fuse in some capacity with what is temporally and socially appropriate. 
The point is that these other interpretations are possible as non-exclusive entities only if 
we take the symbolic nature of the text, and seek the irreducible essence, which is that 
God intervenes on behalf of his people. The dynamic relationship between God and his 
people is the basic understanding that goes into the reading of the text, the spiritual 
foundation of the reader. It is hard to deny that even if not made explicit, (even when the 
reader lacks the self-awareness of his or her own temporality) the highlighting of this 
symbolic capacity occurs each time scripture is used in a new era, or even moment. 
"The truth, or revelation of Scripture does not lie in its articulated religious 
teachings, which may at times be contradictory, but rather in the authenticity of its 
authors, an authenticity which the community is able to recognize."253 It is crucial to 
point out here, that there are non-religious modes of this expression, as well as similarly 
metaphoric expressions in other religions, and that a true methodology of readership that 
takes ethics of the other into account must recognize the legitimacy of these non-biblical 
but still inspired sources. A biblical community is still finite in its horizons to some 
degree, even when it understands itself symbolically. This is not a failing though, if it 
remembers its own fmitude. 
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When ethics is considered, it is only if dialectic is embraced, and if the fact that 
multiple alternatives exist is taken into account, that "biblical truth"254 is restored. It is 
within the very tenets of scripture in its narratives of revelation and prophecy, that this is 
encouraged. As new voices, new interpretations come to light, the truth of the bible as 
dynamic plays itself out. The symbolic approach not only respects this, it encourages it. 
In other words, there is always another other, other than a specifically addressed 
recipient. Within the realms of theory and justice, symbolic self-understanding, and 
transcendental method need to be remembered. Or in other words, one ought to pay heed 
to the significance of relationality in revealed ethics. Certainly, this is true when dealing 
with scripture as an ethical source. 
It is not merely a question of uncovering the context alone. McEvenue writes: 
"The implications of . . . insight and . . . affirmation . . . can be conceptualized in terms of 
materialism, feminism, sexuality, and so forth [as] implicitly affirmed about reality by 
[the] artistic product." In reference to biblical literature he adds, "these kinds of questions 
can be asked. However, they are not specifically religious [that is, ethical] questions."255 
For him the religious question is a spiritual groundedness that anticipates divine 
revelation. This is like asking toward what ethical orientation the text inspires. How and 
why does it move the reader? What does it move the reader to do? 
However we approach this last question, we must never take our answers, our 
understanding, as fixed. The precepts of truly dynamic ethics, of transcendental method, 
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suggest we must maintain a vigilance that is not only sensitive to the answers of others, 
but to the future of answers, and the blatant fact of our incomplete grasp. In other words, 
we should never forget that we are engaged in interpretation that is relational. 
A SPIRAL PROCESS - THE SYMBOL AS PRIMARY 
Ricoeur describes a three-fold process of interpretation as a "creative engagement 
or conversation between the text of a tradition and contemporary experience."256 
First there must be an initial openness to what the text might say or the question it might raise in 
the light of the interpreter's own experience. . . .The second step seeks to move . . to a critical 
explanation of it by employing various methods... Here is where [Cook] locate[s] Dulles' first 
three models; propositional, historical, and experiential. As indispensable, they are intrinsic to 
revelation as metaphoric process; but as subordinate, they can be perceived to be revelatory only 
in relation to the primacy of symbol. There is a natural and necessary move of the human mind 
toward definitions and descriptions, but the danger is to think that our human conceptualization 
and systems have grasped or exhausted the content of the mystery. Thus, Ricoeur's third step is a 
return to the symbol as primary. Once we have gone through the process of critical appropriation 
and have been transformed by a new comprehension, we experience the symbol ever anew with a 
second, postcritical naivete. This process is a continuous spiral, as the new experience of the 
symbol (or text) will give rise to new thought, etc.257 
"The Bible," writes Heschel, "is not an intellectual sinecure, and its acceptance 
should not be like setting up a talismanic lock that seals both the mind and the conscience 
against the intrusion of new thought... The full meaning of Biblical words was not 
disclosed once and for all. Every hour another aspect is unveiled... The Torah is an 
invitation to perceptivity, a call for continuous understanding.. . The Bible is a seed, God 
is the sun, but we are the soil. Every generation is expected to bring forth new 
understanding and new realization." 
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ESCHATOLOGY AND MEANING 
"For the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures, God is fully revealed only at the end of 
history. This logically includes the whole of history from beginning to end."259 
Likewise, McEvenue states that "Biblical truth speaks about a truth that will only be 
known in the future." This is significant ethically in the sense that the future is other, 
unknowable and ungraspable by us. If the full potential of meaning of any and all texts 
will only be 'revealed' at the end of time, this is because the contemporary always and 
inevitably offers new meaning for old texts - thus any written phrase will mean more and 
more over time. As far as determining meaning, McEvenue puts it aptly, "This reader of 
the Bible, for one, is more aware of the many ticks than of the apocalyptic tock."261 
For Heschel, the eschatological realm is the realm of fully realized Biblical 
meaning. This has a parallel in Christian eschatology. Cook discusses the symbolism of 
the resurrection of Christ - which falls beyond the scope of this paper. However, the 
category of Christian eschatology is important here. McEvenue distinguishes between 
the Word of God as fully revealed in the person of Jesus Christ at the time of the New 
Testament, and the full revelation of Jesus in the parousia at the end of time.262 Despite 
the notion that the Word is a complete revelation, there is still the indication that human 
understanding of such revelation will only be attainable at the end of time. 
Herein lies the space for humility. Cook writes, "Christianity would lose its self-
identity if it ceased to make claims for the absolute uniqueness of Jesus . . .On the other 
hand, Christianity equally loses its self-identity when it turns from service in and for the 
259
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260
 McEvenue, p.44. 
261
 McEvenue, p.84. 
262
 Ibid. p.45. 
85 
world to imperialistic claims for its own superiority... Such claims are contrary to the 
spirit of Jesus. ,."263 
Understanding the metaphoric capacity of Jesus allows us to emulate him - to see 
in him an example of innovation in interpretation with service toward the other as the 
motivation. Service of the other must include the non-Christian if it is to be in dialogue 
with those outside of the Christian community. Thus, "Christianity must be open to the 
possibility of equally final and definitive in the strict sense outside Christianity."264 It 
should always be noted that other religions should be "encountered as a resource that is 
intrinsically constitutive of any valid theology."265 
Heschel emphasizes again and again that revelation is in fact a reminder that we 
cannot define the world by a set of closed and fixed laws. "What do we mean, "the 
world?" he asks. "If we mean an ultimate, closed fixed and self-sufficient system of 
phenomena behaving in accord with the laws known to us, then such a concept would 
exclude the possibility of admitting any super-mundane intervention or penetration by a 
voice not accounted for by these laws... reality is a mystery given but not known."266 It 
is clear from these statements that for Heschel, ontology is inadequate in conveying the 
otherness that revelation intends. Revelation is not of the past alone. "The journey with 
God includes both memory that preserves past identity (and so can be "dangerous") and 
imagination that opens up new and unforeseen possibilities for the future. It is narrative 
in form, but each story has universal import."267 
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CONCLUSION 
In our ethical search, the alterity of the other forces us to turn away from 
preconceived notions of 'the Good.' If we act from these preconceived codes of ethics, 
in the words of Derrida: "we could simply unfold knowledge into a program or course of 
action. Nothing could make us more irresponsible: nothing could be more 
totalitarian."268 
If theological study is the undertaking of an ethical quest, as Lonergan certainly 
suggests it is, it must never let go of the concern of possession of knowledge, for in such 
presumption, actual ethics is undermined. Theological study must therefore concretize 
this concern by painstakingly unraveling its own fmitude. Self-awareness in the context 
of history, culture and language is therefore an integral prerequisite to any transcendent 
notion. Such self-awareness need not be lamented. It can be seen as ethical, but only 
when it understands its own relationality to what lies outside of its realm. 
If ethics is transcendent, it must be true that theological ethical truth, that is, 
divinely revealed knowledge regarding the good, must be, rather than content that can be 
encapsulated in a given culture's truth, a kind of truth that surpasses any given time and 
place, self or group. It must be the revealment of relationality itself. 
This claim has profound implications both in its blatant deconstruction of several 
theological models and claims, and in its reparation of theology at large in the context of 
the severe criticism by the secular/scientific world, as well as the challenges of 
multiculturalism. Such reparation is possible predominantly because of human language, 
which allows for the transfer of concepts from specific contexts to other contexts. This is 
the metaphoric capacity. 
.'"' Derrida J, Adieu to Emannuel Levinas. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, (in, Poepke, 2004). 
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Ethical reparation of theology is possible because the structure of language 
accounts for and in fact reveals relationality. The essence of this relational dynamic is 
made overt in symbol, and therefore symbol is an ideal paradigm by which to understand 
relational human knowledge within a spatial and temporal axis. It understands itself as 
both specifically situated and transcendent in endeavor, as the ethical task indeed must 
be. 
The Jewish and Christian models of revelation embrace this phenomenon in both 
structure and content, indicating a kind of hybrid of both. The radical mystery of the 
divine serves as the ethical parallel to the unknown other that impinges upon our 
consciousness and demands our vigilant attention. The response is not a pre-set one, but 
a coming to awareness of our finitude and an embrace of intending value that intends 
both inclusiveness in determining value and the sense that such determination is an open-
ended process. 
The symbolic methodology that these understandings of revelation offer has a 
profound influence on the way in which moral education is handled, primarily in the 
approach to the content of its sources. A fundamental shift from an authoritarian model 
has to occur for truly ethical encounters to have room. Thus, in the case of sacred 
scripture, a shift from bible as authority to bible as artistic affirmation of a spiritual 
foundation might be more appropriate. Emphasis on the longevity of the spirit through 
ever-unfolding interpretations of scripture needs to be embraced. 
But this shift need not only occur in the religious realm. Both Levinasian ethics 
and Lonerganian method have been steadily applied to the field of education at large, 
where curriculum and teachers as bodies of authority have been replaced by the emphasis 
88 
on student experience and process as opposed to content.269 Other fields that have 
traditionally relied on authority and ontological ethics have been profoundly altered by 
these thinkers.270 The kernel of ethical truth is relationality. This is itself the content that 
needs to be taught and emphasized. 
Jewish and Christian theology can be helpful tools. The social and temporal 
dynamic relationship between divine and human history, especially with an 
eschatological horizon, takes this very same form. Symbol/metaphor, revelation and 
ethical meaning all share a fundamental principle which is the tension between the finite 
subjective and infinity of otherness, and this is itself ethical in content. This dynamic 
brings us back to what Woloski called a positive approach to our finitude. Indeed, it is 
only in the present moment that things take meaning. The historical is the linear thread 
of these present moments, and the future is what humbles us, and keeps us from 
perceiving our understanding of the good as total. 
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